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FOREWORD 
 
 
The Debris Team has developed and implemented measures to control damage from debris in the 
Shuttle operational environment and to make the control measures a part of routine launch flows. 
These measures include engineering surveillance during vehicle processing and closeout 
operations, facility and flight hardware inspections before and after launch, and photographic 
analysis of mission events. 
 
Photographic analyses of mission imagery from launch, on-orbit, and landing provide significant 
data in verifying proper operation of systems and evaluating anomalies. In addition to the 
Kennedy Space Center Photo/Video Analysis, reports from Johnson Space Center and Marshall 
Space Flight Center are also included in this document to provide an integrated assessment of the 
mission. 
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Photo 1:  Launch of Shuttle Mission STS-108 
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1.0  SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 
 
STS-108 consisted of OV-105 Endeavour (17th flight), ET-111, and BI-110 SRB’s on MLP-1 
and Pad 39B. Endeavour was launched at 5:19 pm EDT on 5 December 2001. Landing was at 
12:55 p.m. local/eastern time on 17 December 2001. 
 
The GH2 vent line did not latch on the FSS latching mechanism.  It appears the vent line 
impacted the south side of the FSS structure preventing the latch back and caused substantial 
damage to the saddle structure.  The south side bridle cable sheared from the southern tang on 
the yoke.  Pieces of debris (bolts and clevis leg) were found on/in the grating and vent line 
structure.  The GUCP sustained minor damage from the vent line impact with the FSS.  The 7-
inch QD exhibited no damage and the poppet was observed to be intact. The deceleration cable 
was in nominal configuration, and the vent line blanket was sooted and torn. 
 
Post landing inspection of Orbiter tiles showed a total of 95 hits, of which 22 had a major 
dimension of 1-inch or larger.  The Orbiter lower surface sustained 81 total hits, of which 17 had 
a major dimension of 1-inch or larger, both numbers are within family.  The majority of the hits 
(49 total with 12 greater than 1-inch) were located in the area aft of the main landing gear wheel 
wells.  Most of these damage sites around the ET/ORB umbilical were most likely caused by 
pieces of the umbilical purge barrier flailing in the airstream and contacting tiles before pulling 
loose and falling aft. 
  
In summary, both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or 
larger were somewhat less than the family average.   
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2.0  PRE-LAUNCH BRIEFING 
 
The Debris/Ice/TPS and Photographic Analysis Team briefing for launch activities was 
conducted at 1400 on 3 December 2001. The following personnel participated in various team 
activities, assisted in the collection and evaluation of data, and contributed to reports contained 
in this document. 
 
A.Oliu    NASA - KSC Shuttle Ice/Debris Systems 
J. Rivera    NASA - KSC ET Mechanisms/Structures  
R. Speece   NASA - KSC ET Thermal Protection Systems 
B. Nguyen   NASA - KSC  SRB Mechanical Systems 
M. Payne   NASA - KSC  SRB Mechanical Systems 
R. Page   NASA - KSC SSP Integration 
K. Leggett   USA - SFOC Supervisor, ET/SRB Mechanical Systems 
J. Blue    USA - SFOC ET Mechanical Systems 
W. Richards   USA - SFOC ET Mechanical Systems 
M. Wollam   USA - SFOC ET Mechanical Systems 
T. Ford   USA - SFOC ET Mechanical Systems 
R. Brewer   USA - SFOC ET Mechanical Systems 
D. Leggett   Boeing  Systems Integration 
B. Atkinson   Boeing  Systems Integration 
T. Wilson   Boeing  Systems Integration 
S. Otto    LMMSS  ET Processing 
M. Eastwood    Thiokol-LSS SRM Processing 
 
 
 
2.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD DEBRIS INSPECTION 
 
The pre-launch inspection of the MLP-1, Pad B FSS and RSS was conducted on 3 December 
2001 from 1500 to 1700 hrs EDT.  No flight hardware issues/anomalies were detected. 
 
 
No facility items were documented in Appendix K of S0007VL4.  Minor clean-up items were in-
work.   
 
Additional Pad work, including preperations for RSS rollback, was in-work at the conclusion of 
the Debris Inspection.   
 
After the pre-launch inspection, but before start of propellant loading, PR-ET-TS-0018 was 
initiated during operation OMI T6446 to document damaged ET TPS.  The crushed foam was 
located under the GO2 pressurization line at Xt-852.  The area measured 1-1/2 inches in 
diameter, with a depth of ¼-inch.  Since the area where the damaged foam was located has 
underlying foam of approximately 4-inches thick, the PR was dipositioned to use-as-is, with 
Material Review Board (MRB) approval. 
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Photo 2:  Area of damaged ET TPS under GO2 Pressurization line 
PR-ET-TS-0018 was initiated to document crushed foam. 
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3.0 SCRUB 
 
3.1 FINAL INSPECTION – Weather Scrub 
 
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed from 1115 to 1250 hrs on 4 
December 2001 during the two-hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown.  There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or OMRS criteria violations. There was no acreage icing 
concerns.  There was also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established database.   
 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain 
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual 
temperature gradients. 
 
3.1.1 ORBITER 
 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed.  The RCS thruster paper covers were 
intact though covers for thrusters F1L, F2D, and R4U were discolored.  Ice/frost had formed all  
the way around the SSME #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interface and from the 3 to 9 o’clock position 
around the SSME #1 heat shield-to-nozzle interface.  
 
3.1.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
 
No SRB case, closeout, or protuberance anomalies were observed.  SRB case temperatures 
measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures, ranging from 70 to 76 
degrees F.  All measured temperatures were above the minimum requirement.  
 
3.1.3 EXTERNAL TANK 
 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared 
scanner point measurements. The program predicted temperatures above the 32 degrees F 
throughout ET cryoload. The following table shows ambient condition, SURFICE prediction and 
IR surface temperatures at the start of FIT walkdown.  The SURFICE Ice Prediction Program 
does not take into account the effect the sun has on the ET surface temperatures.   
 
Ambient conditions – 1100hrs SURFICE Predictions IR Surface Readings 
74 Degrees F. LO2 ogive    64 Degrees F LO2 Tank 56-68 Degrees F 
81% RH LO2 barrel   56 Degrees F    
7 knots LH2 upper   51 Degrees F LH2 Tank  51-61 Degrees F 
004 degrees LH2 lower   61 Degrees F  
 
 
The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensation on the LO2 tank acreage.  No 
acreage ice/frost formations were observed.  The area of crushed ET TPS documented on PR-
ET-TS-0018 was free of any ice/frost formations.  There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 
tank. 
 
No significant anomalies were present in the intertank TPS. One crack in the intertank stringer 
valley TPS was observed (-Z of –Y thrust panel). The crack exhibited no ice, frost, nor offset. 
Therefore, the crack was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. Ice and frost 
accumulations on the GUCP were typical. 
The LH2 tank was wet with light condensate.  There were no acreage TPS anomalies.   
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Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.  
 
A 2-1/2 inch long and 1/8 inch wide stress relief crack was observed in the –Y vertical strut TPS 
with no offset. This condition has been observed on previous vehicles and found acceptable for 
flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.  
 
There were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice and frost in the LH2 
recirculation line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. Likewise, a typical amount of 
ice/frost had accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier outboard side, inboard 
side, forward, and aft surfaces. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and 
plate gap purge vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable 
replenish, and launch.  
 
 
3.1.4 FACILITY 
 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch. No 
leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.   
 
 
3.2 T-3 HOURS TO SCRUB  
 
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch 
Control Center. Twenty-two remote-controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers 
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle.  No anomalies were detected during this 
timeframe. 
 
This attempt to launch STS-108 was scrubbed due to inclement weather in the launch area. 
 
 
3.3 POST DRAIN INSPECTION 
 
The post drain inspection of STS-108, MLP-1, and Pad B FSS was conducted on December 4, 
2001 from 2300 to 0015 hours under dark conditions. Nevertheless, visibility was adequate for 
the inspection.  
 
No MLP deck or facility anomalies were detected. 
 
Likewise, no anomalies were observed on the SRBs. 
 
Orbiter tiles, RCC panels, and SSME’s were in nominal configuration. RCS thruster paper 
covers were intact. 
 
The GOX vent arm was in the retracted position.  OTV monitoring from LCC Firing Room 2 
was performed prior to and during GVA retraction and had verified no anomalies with the vent 
system or the ET nose cone and forward LO2 tank TPS.  The post detank Pad inspection also 
verified no anomalies in this area.  No topcoat was missing from the nose cone area under the 
GOX vent seal footprint.  
 
The External Tank was in excellent condition. Bipod jack pad standoff closeouts were in 
nominal condition. All PDL repairs were intact with none protruding. No crushed foam or debris 
was detected in the LO2 feedline support brackets. The cryogenic stress relief crack in the –Y 
vertical strut forward facing TPS closed up during vehicle warm up and was no longer visible by 
the time the post drain inspection team reached that location to visually inspect. 
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The only ice remaining was located in the LO2/LH2 feedline bellows, the lower EB fittings, and 
on the ET/ORB umbilical purge vents.  
 
The three ET burst discs were monitored from the LCC Firing Room 2 via OTV and inspected 
from the MLP Zero Level and no anomaly was observed. 
 
In summary, no IPR conditions and no flight hardware concerns were detected during the post 
drain inspection.  There were no constraints for the next cryoload. 
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4.0 LAUNCH 
 
4.1 PRE-LAUNCH SSV/PAD INSPECTION  
 
The Post-Drain and additional T-8 hour inspection of the Pad and SSV performed as a result of 
the weather scrub satisfied the pre-launch inspection requirement.  No new issues or concerns 
were detected. 
 
4.2 FINAL INSPECTION  
 
The Final Inspection of the cryoloaded vehicle was performed from 1130 to 1310 hrs on 5 
December 2001 during the two-hour built-in-hold at T-3 hours in the countdown.  There were no 
Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) or OMRS criteria violations. There was no acreage icing 
concerns.  There was also no protuberance icing conditions outside of the established database.   
 
A portable Shuttle Thermal Imager (STI) infrared scanning radiometer was utilized to obtain 
vehicle surface temperature measurements for an overall thermal assessment of the vehicle, 
particularly those areas not visible from remote fixed scanners, and to scan for unusual 
temperature gradients. 
 
4.2.1 ORBITER 
 
No Orbiter tile or RCC panel anomalies were observed.  The RCS thruster paper covers were 
intact though covers for thrusters F1L, F2D, F3D and R4U were discolored.  Ice/frost had 
formed 
all the way around the SSME #2 heat shield-to-nozzle interface and from the 3 to 9 o’clock 
position around the SSME #1 heat shield-to-nozzle interface.  
 
4.2.2 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 
 
No SRB case, closeout, or protuberance anomalies were observed.  SRB case temperatures 
measured by the STI radiometers were close to ambient temperatures, ranging from 70 to 75 
degrees F.  All measured temperatures were above the minimum requirement.  
 
4.2.3 EXTERNAL TANK 
 
The ice/frost prediction computer program 'SURFICE' was run as a comparison to infrared 
scanner point measurements. The program predicted temperatures above the 32 degrees F 
throughout ET cryoload. The following table shows ambient condition, SURFICE prediction and 
IR surface temperatures at the start of FIT walkdown.  The SURFICE Ice Prediction Program 
does not take into account the effect the sun has on the ET surface temperatures.   
 
Ambient conditions – 1100hrs SURFICE Predictions IR Surface Readings 
73 Degrees F. LO2 ogive    66 Degrees F LO2 Tank 57-75 Degrees F 
84% RH LO2 barrel   62 Degrees F    
13 knots LH2 upper   61 Degrees F LH2 Tank  59-78 Degrees F 
069 degrees LH2 lower   65 Degrees F  
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The Final Inspection Team observed very light condensation on the LO2 tank acreage.  No 
acreage ice/frost formations were observed.  As in the previous tanking the area of crushed ET 
TPS documented on PR-ET-TS-0018 was free of any ice/frost formations.  There were no TPS 
anomalies. 
 
No significant anomalies were present in the intertank TPS.  One crack in the intertank stringer 
valley TPS was observed (-Z of –Y thrust panel).  This was the same crack identified on the 
inspection the previous day.  The crack exhibited no ice, frost, nor offset.  Therefore, the crack 
was acceptable for flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.  Frost spots were observed above 
fasteners in the intertank valleys (4th and 5th intertank valleys –Z of the –Y thrust panel and 
between 16th and 17th stringers +Z of the –Y thrust panel).  This condition is acceptable per 
NSTS-08303.  Ice and frost accumulations on the GUCP were typical. 
   
The LH2 tank was wet with moderate condensate on the upper portion and significantly more 
condensation at the aft end.  There were no acreage TPS anomalies.   
 
Typical amounts of ice/frost had accumulated in the LO2 feedline bellows and support brackets.  
 
A 2-1/2 inch long and 1/8 inch wide stress relief crack was observed in the –Y vertical strut TPS 
with no offset. This condition has been observed on previous vehicles and found acceptable for 
flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria.  
 
A small frost spot was detected at approximately the 1 o’clock position on the forward edge of 
the +Y thrust strut knuckle.  This frost spot was dissipating as time went on due to all the 
condensate running off in the area.  This frost formation is acceptable per NSTS-08303.  There 
were no TPS anomalies on the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical. Ice and frost in the LH2 recirculation 
line bellows and on both burst disks was typical. Likewise, a typical amount of ice/frost had 
accumulated on the LH2 ET/ORB umbilical purge barrier outboard side, inboard side, forward, 
and aft surfaces. Typical ice/frost fingers were present on the pyro canister and plate gap purge 
vents. No unusual vapors or cryogenic drips had appeared during tanking, stable replenish, and 
launch.  
 
 
4.2.4 FACILITY 
 
All SRB sound suppression water troughs were filled and properly configured for launch. No 
leaks were observed on the GUCP or the LO2 and LH2 Orbiter T-0 umbilicals.   
 
 
4.3 T-3 HOURS TO LAUNCH  
 
After completion of the Final Inspection on the pad, surveillance continued from the Launch 
Control Center. Twenty-two remote-controlled television cameras and two infrared radiometers 
were utilized to perform scans of the vehicle.  No anomalies were detected during this 
timeframe. 
 
 
STS-108 launched at 22:19:27 UTC (5:19 pm local) on December 5, 2001. 
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Photo 3:  LO2 tank acreage. 
Very little condensate was present on the LO2 tank acreage. Surface temperature ranged from 
57-75 degrees Fahrenheit. There were no acreage TPS anomalies. 
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Photo 4:  LH2 tank acreage. 
The LH2 tank was wet with moderate condensate on the upper portion and significantly more 
condensation at the aft end.  Surface temperature ranged 59 to 78 degrees Fahrenheit. There were 
no acreage TPS anomalies. 
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Photo 5:  Crack in –Y Vertical Strut TPS 
 
A 2-1/2 inch long and 1/8 inch wide stress relief crack was observed in the –Y vertical strut TPS 
with no offset.  This condition has been observed on previous vehicles and found acceptable for 
flight per the NSTS-08303 criteria. 
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Photo 6:  Frost spot over fastener location in intertank valley. 
One of four frost spots observed above fasteners. 
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Photo 7:  LO2 Umbilical area. 
Typical ice/frost finger on pyro canister vent and on LO2 feedline bellows. 
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5.0 POST LAUNCH PAD DERBIS INSPECTION 
 
The post launch inspection of the MLP-1, Pad B FSS and RSS was conducted on 5 December 
2001 from Launch + 2.75 to 4.5 hours (2000 to 2230 EST). 
 
No flight hardware was found. 
 
Orbiter liftoff lateral acceleration data to predict stud hang-ups received from Boeing-
Huntington Beach indicated that no SRB holddown stud hang-up had occurred, the reported 
value was 0.09G. Evaluation of the MLP 0-level was performed and the south holddown studs 
were visually assessed as having no indication of hang-up.  Erosion was typical for the north 
posts with some evidence of missing RTV at the HDP haunch interface.  North holddown post 
blast covers and T-0 umbilical exhibited minimal exhaust plume damage. Both SRB aft skirt 
GN2 purge lines were intact, protective tape layering was partially eroded on the RH purge line 
and the metal braid was partially eroded on the LH purge line.  
 
The LO2 and LH2 Tail Service Masts (TSM) appeared undamaged and the LO2 bonnet was 
observed to have closed properly. The MLP deck was in generally good shape.  All MLP deck 
communication connector caps were found intact and secured.    
 
The GH2 vent line did not latch on the FSS latching mechanism.  It appears the vent line 
impacted the south side of the FSS structure preventing the latch back and caused substantial 
damage to the saddle structure.  The south side bridle cable sheared from the southern tang on 
the yoke.  Pieces of debris (bolts and clevis leg) were found on/in the grating and vent line 
structure.  The GUCP sustained minor damage from the vent line impact with the FSS.  The 7-
inch QD exhibited no damage and the poppet was observed to be intact. The deceleration cable 
was in nominal configuration, and the vent line blanket was sooted and torn.  IFA STS-0108-K-
001 was generated to document and investigate the anomaly. 
 
The OAA appeared to be intact with no evidence of plume impingement.   
 
All slidewire baskets were secured with no evidence of damage. 
 
The GOX vent arm, ducts and structure appeared to be in good shape with no indications of 
plume damage.  The access door window on the north side of the hood was broken with loss of 
material.  A major hydraulic leak was observed on the GOX vent arm/FSS structure hinge (255’ 
Level). 
 
Debris findings included: 
 
• FSS 235’ level loose cable tray cover latch. 
• RSS 215’ level broken light fixture. 
• FSS 215’ level electrical box shorted out burning through the box. 
• FSS 175’ level pressure gauge cover was found near gauge on grating. 
• FSS 155’ level pressure gauge cover was noted in cable tray (source not determined). 
• MLP deck a piece of steel cable with swedge (kellum grip) was found on the east side. 
• Pad surface a 7/8” facility nut was found near the MLP North West pedestal. 
• Pad surface numerous pieces of fragmented metal were found (1/16” aluminum) 
 
  
Overall damage to the pad appeared to be slightly greater than nominal.    
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Photo 8:  Overall view of GH2 vent line haunch on the FSS post launch. 
GH2 vent line struck the FSS and failed to latch back.  
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Photo 9:  Detail view of some of the damage sustained by the GH2 vent line after impact 
with FSS. 
 
GH2 Vent Line
Structure 
Latching Mechanism 
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6.0 FILM REVIEW 
 
Gaseous Hydrogen vent line contacted south side of support structure at two locations; the saddle 
plate and the bridle cable connection.  Contact caused debris, which fell toward SRB exhaust.    
Vent line did not latch-back and rebounded approximately 3-feet.  No contact with flight 
hardware was observed.  (E-41, E-42, E-60)  IFA STS-0108-K-001 was generated to investigate 
the cause.    
 
6.1 LAUNCH FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
 
A total of 68 films and videos, which included 16mm films, 35mm films, and Operational 
Television Video (OTV) camera videos, were reviewed starting on launch day. 
 
SRB separation appeared normal.  (E-207, E-212, E-223) 
 
SSME Mach diamond formation sequence was 3-2-1 (E-76, -77) 
 
Charring on the ET aft dome was typical. (E-207, E-220, E-223, E-224) 
 
Umbilical purge barrier baggie material fell during roll maneuver. (E-52, E-207, E-212, E-220, 
E-222) 
 
Forward RCS paper covers were observed falling aft during early ascent. (E-52, E-54, E-207, E-
212, E-213, E-220, E-222, E-223, E-224) 
 
Pieces of facility debris entered field of view well after vehicle cleared tower. (E-36, E-40). 
 
Ice from forward LO2 feedline bellows seen falling between ET and Orbiter.  No contact with 
orbiter noted.  (E-34, E-40) 
 
GUCP separation from ET nominal. (E-33) 
 
No stud hang up, or ordnance fragments were observed on any of the SRB hold-down posts. 
 
After T-0 object seen moving across field of view toward camera E-1 and away from flight 
hardware.  No contact with flight hardware noted.  (E-1) 
 
No OMS pod flexing observed. (E-17, E-18) 
 
Debris particle observed emanating from near DCS of HDP #1, moves away from the SRB and 
aft of orbiter.  No contact with flight hardware. (E-9) 
 
Piece of debris noted between HDP 3 and shoe. (E-10) 
 
RTV from base of HDP ejected out of SRB hole and contacted top of HDP #3 blast cover 
momentarily before being expelled.  No contact with flight hardware.  (E-10, E-15) 
 
Free-burning GH2 was blown toward vertical stabilizer. 
 
Several ice particles fell from ET/ORB umbilicals during SSME ignition. 
 
Vapors on ET aft dome and SRB stiffener rings were observed after T-0. 
 
Ice particles fell from LH2 / LO2 TSM T-0 disconnects. 
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Tile surface coating material was lost from aft face of LH OMS RCS stinger.  This is a common 
occurrence due to SSME ignition acoustics. (E-20) 
 
SRB throat plug material ejected from exhaust hole.  No contact with vehicle. 
 
Deluge water pipe leaking adjacent to HDP 8, water dripping on MLP deck. (E-14) 
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Photo 10:  GH2 Vent Line strikes FSS, generating debris, and fails to latch-back. 
This view shows the maximum rebound of the vent line. 
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Photo 11:  GH2 Vent Line strikes FSS, generating debris, and fails to latch-back. 
 
Debris generated after impact
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6.2 ON-ORBIT FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
 
16mm film motion picture films from the LH2 umbilical cameras were reviewed.  The 35mm 
still images from the LO2 ET/ORB umbilical camera and Crew Hand-Held Still Images, of the 
External Tank were not taken due to darkness.   
 
Left-hand SRB separation appeared to be nominal.   
 
Ablation and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2 cable tray and the –Y vertical strut thermal 
protection appeared normal. 
 
The ET separation from the Orbiter was in darkness and could not be analyzed.   
 
 
 
6.3 LANDING FILM AND VIDEO SUMMARY 
 
A total of 15 films and videos, which included eight 35mm large format films and nine videos, 
were reviewed.  
 
The landing gear extended properly.   
 
Drag chute deployment appeared normal.  However, a hole in the drag chute canopy was 
observed.  Post landing evaluation of drag chute revealed that ribbons 34 through 40 on gore 31, 
as well as a vertical ribbon were broken.  No exact cause of the tear could be determined from 
the evaluation or the films. 
 
No additional anomalies were detected from touchdown through rollout.   
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7.0 SRB POST FLIGHT/RETRIEVAL DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
 
The BI-110 Solid Rocket Boosters were inspected for debris damage and debris sources at 
CCAFS Hangar AF on 8 December 2001. Generally, both boosters were in excellent condition.   
 
The TPS on both frustums exhibited no debonds/unbonds. There was minor localized blistering 
of the Hypalon paint.  
 
All eight BSM aero heat shield covers had fully opened and locked, but one RH and two LH 
cover attach rings had been bent at the hinge by parachute riser entanglement. 
 
The forward skirts exhibited no debonds or missing TPS. RSS antennae covers/phenolic base 
plates were intact, though one layer of the LH and RH SRB +Z antenna phenolic base plate had 
delamination at the edge. 
 
The Field Joint Protection System (FJPS) and the System Tunnel Covers closeouts were 
generally in good condition with no unbonds observed.  
 
Separation planes of the aft ET/SRB struts appeared normal.  
 
Aft skirt external surface TPS was in good condition. Typical blistering of Hypalon paint had 
occurred on the BTA insulation close-outs and GEI cork runs. 
 
The holddown post Debris Containment Systems (DCS) appeared to have functioned normally 
except on HDP No. 1 which was fully obstructed by the frangible nut halves.  This condition 
most likely happened at water impact. 
 
No indication of stud hang up was observed. 
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Photo 12:  LH Frustum Post Flight Condition 
The LH SRB frustum exhibited no debonds/unbonds or missing TPS. 
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Photo 13:  RH Frustum Post Flight Condition 
The RH SRB frustum exhibited no debonds/unbonds or missing TPS. 
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Photo 14:  BSM Cover Condition 
One RH and two LH cover attach rings had been bent at the hinge by parachute riser 
entanglement. 
 
LH 
RH 
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Photo 15:  SRB Post Flight Condition 
Both SRB’s were found in good condition regarding debris assessment 
LH 
RH 
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8.0 ORBITER POST LANDING DEBRIS ASSESSMENT 
 
After the 12:56 p.m. local/eastern time landing on 17 December 2001, a post landing inspection 
of OV-105 Endeavour was conducted at the Kennedy Space Center on SLF runway 15 and in 
Orbiter Processing Facility bay 1. This inspection was performed to identify debris impact 
damage and, if possible, debris sources. 
 
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 95 hits of which 22 had a major dimension of 1-inch or 
larger.  This total does not include the numerous hits on the base heat shields attributed to SSME 
vibration/acoustics and exhaust plume recirculation. 
 
The following table lists the STS-108 Orbiter damage hits by area: 
 
       HITS > 1-inch    TOTAL HITS 
Lower Surface     17     81 
Upper Surface       1      1  
Window Area       4      13 
Right Side       0      0 
Left Side       0      0 
Right OMS Pod      0      0 
Left OMS Pod       0      0 
 
TOTALS     22     95 
 
The Orbiter lower surface sustained 81 total hits, of which 17 had a major dimension of 1-inch or 
larger, both numbers are well within family.  The majority of the hits (49 total with 12 greater 
than 1-inch) were located in the area aft of the main landing gear wheel wells.  Approximately 
11 of the total lower surface hits were around the LH2 umbilical area and 24 around the LO2 
umbilical area. Most of these damage sites around the ET/ORB umbilical were most likely 
caused by pieces of the umbilical purge barrier flailing in the airstream and contacting tiles 
before pulling loose and falling aft.  
 
The largest lower surface tile damage site, located inboard of the RH MLG door, measured 8-1/2 
inches long by 1-1/2-inches wide by 3/8-inches deep.  The damage spans three separate tiles.  
The cause of this damage has not been determined yet.  
 
The landing gear tires were in good condition.   
 
ET/Orbiter separation devices EO-1, EO-2, and EO-3 functioned normally. No ordnance 
fragments were found on the runway beneath the umbilicals. The EO-2 and EO-3 fitting retainer 
springs appeared to be in nominal configuration, though one of the “salad bowl” clips was 
missing from EO-2 and 6 were missing from EO-3.   The EO-2/3 pyro debris shutters were fully 
closed.  A small piece of white RTV (1/2 inch long by 1/8 inch diameter) used for umbilical test-
port closeout process was found under the LH2 umbilical.  No other debris was found beneath 
the umbilicals.   
 
Typical amount of tile damage occurred on the base heat shield. All SSME Dome Heat Shield 
closeout blankets were in good condition.   
 
There were a total of 13 hits, with 4 having one dimension greater than 1-inch, on the window 
perimeter tiles.  Hazing and streaking of forward-facing Orbiter windows appears to be less than 
normal.   
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A 1-1/2 inch diameter by 1/4 inch deep tile damage was noted on the +Z side of the body flap, 
underneath SSME #3.   
 
The post-landing walkdown of Runway 15 was performed immediately after landing.  All 
components of the drag chute were recovered and appeared to have functioned normally.   
 
In summary, the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger 
were within established family.    
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Figure 1:  Orbiter Lower Surface Debris Damage Map 
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Figure 2:  Orbiter Upper Surface Debris Damage Map 
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Figure 3:  Overall View of Orbiter Sides 
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Figure 4:  Orbiter Post Flight Debris Damage Summary 
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Figure 5:  Control Limits for Lower Surface Hits 
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Figure 6:  Control Limits for Total Hits 
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Photo 16:  Overall View of Orbiter sides 
The Orbiter TPS sustained a total of 95 hits of which 22 had a major dimension of 1-inch or 
larger.  Both the total number of Orbiter TPS debris hits and the number of hits 1-inch or larger 
were within established family. 
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Photo 17:  Overall View of Orbiter Windows 
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Photo 18: ORB/ET  LH2 Umbilical 
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Photo 19:  ORB/ET LO2 Umbilical 
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9.0 DEBRIS SAMPLE LAB REPORTS 
    
Window wipe samples from Orbiter windows 1 thru 8 were submitted to the KSC 
Microchemical Analysis Branch (MAB) for material/chemical identification analysis and 
comparison to known STS materials.  The results of this analysis are summarized below. 
 
Sample residuals provided indication of Orbiter Thermal Protection System (TPS) materials, 
metallics and metallic corrosion, paint, natural landing site, and organic materials.   
 
The organic material analysis provided indication of proteinaceous (as in insect remains), 
polyurethane (window cover), and silicone (RCS thruster cover/Orbiter TPS) materials. 
  
Post-landing sample results provided no new information or trend data for debris source analysis. 
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10.0 POST-LAUNCH ANOMALIES 
 
Based on the debris walkdowns and film/video review, the only post-launch anomalies was the 
GH2 vent line contact with the FSS and subsequent debris generated from the impact.  IFA STS-
0108-K-001 was generated to document and investigate the anomaly.  The investigation team 
concluded that there were two major contributors to the anomaly; 
 
- North Haunch Pivot Arm Shock Absorber was very stiff causing the Haunch Pivot 
Arm to twist when it impacted the shocks. This caused the Vent Line to go further 
south during retraction. 
 
- Wind was the 2nd strongest recorded at Pad B from the Northeast (15.5 knots) at T-0 
(STS-51L to present). This caused the Vent Line to go further south during retraction. 
 
The shock absorbers were removed and refurbished.  Modifications are in-work at both launch 
pads to increase the clearance between vent line and the FSS.  
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1 STS-108 (OV-108):  Film/Video Screening and Timing Summary 
 
1.1 Screening Activities 
 
1.1.1 Launch 
 
The STS-108 launch of Endeavour (OV-105) from Pad B occurred on December 5, 2001 at 
339:22:19:28.055 UTC as seen on camera OTV163.  SRB separation occurred at 22:21:31.935 
UTC as seen on camera E207. 
 
On launch day, 22 videos were received and screened.  Video was not received from cameras 
OTV154 and ET204.  The focus is soft on the long range tracking views (probably due to 
atmospheric haze). 
 
Twenty-four launch films were screened and a report was sent to the Shuttle Program 
distribution on December 9, 2001.  Eighteen additional films were received for contingency 
support and anomaly resolution.  (Camera film E208 was not provided.) 
  
One anomalous event was seen during the review of the STS-108 launch films and videos that 
was elevated to the Launch + 4 Day KSC, JSC, MSFC Film/Video Analysis Teams Consolidated 
Film Review Report.  See Section 2.1.  One anomalous event was also seen during the review of 
the STS-108 landing films that was elevated to the Landing + 3 Day KSC, JSC, MSFC 
Film/Video Analysis Teams Consolidated Film Review Report.  (These reports consolidate the 
multi-center post flight photo reviews into a single list of observations for engineering review. 
This integrates the photo review process into the IFA / PRACA process to ensure that the 
identified observations are assessed and dispositioned prior to the next flight per established 
problem reporting criteria).   No anomalous events were seen on the on-board films that view the 
(left) Solid Rocket Booster. 
 
Two 16mm umbilical well cameras and the new 35mm umbilical well TPS camera flew on STS-
108.  See section 2.3. Crew handheld still photography and video of the External Tank was not 
acquired on STS-108 because of darkness.     
 
1.1.2 On-Orbit 
 
No unplanned on-orbit Shuttle support tasks were requested.    
 
Pre-planned, real-time analysis support was provided to the ISS UF-1 Space Station 
photographic and television external survey.   The Space Station image analysis support will be 
documented in the UF-1 Imagery Overview Report.   
 
1.1.3 Landing 
 
Endeavour made a daylight landing on runway 15 at the KSC Shuttle Landing Facility on 
December 17, 2001 (351:17:55:10.884 UTC).    Ten videos and ten landing films were received.   
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The landing touch down appeared normal.  The drag chute deploy sequence appeared normal on 
the landing imagery, however one anomalous event was seen on the drag chute canopy.  See 
Section 2.2. 
 
Post landing, a sink rate analysis of the STS-108 main landing gear was performed for the main 
gear touchdown.  See Section 2.5.  
 
The STS-108 landing films were screened in support of the drag chute deployment investigation. 
 
 
2 Summary of Significant Events 
 
2.1 KSC, JSC, MSFC Film / Video Analysis Teams Launch + 4 Day Intercenter 
Consolidated Film Review Report 
 
2.1.1 GH2 Vent Impact with FSS  
 
One anomalous event was seen during the review of the STS-108 launch films that was elevated 
to the Launch +4 day Intercenter Consolidated Film Review Report.  An anomalous retraction of 
the Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) vent arm occurred during the launch of STS-108.  The vent arm 
traveled outside of its movement envelope, contacted a vertical beam of the Fixed Support 
Structure (FSS), and partially rebounded from its capture position.  Damage occurred to the FSS 
beam and the GUCP (Gaseous Umbilical Carrier Plate) portion of the vent arm.  A two pound 
piece of debris was generated which may have constituted a risk to the vehicle.   
 
The Shuttle Program considered this event a constraint to the launch of the next Space Shuttle, 
STS-109.  The Space Shuttle Systems Integration Team requested IS&AG (Image Science and 
Analysis Group) to participate in a multi-center (KSC, MSFC, JSC, Huntington Beach) 
investigation of the anomaly.  JSC and MSFC were tasked to provide film analysis of the 
External Tank (ET) Hydrogen Vent Line and carrier plate (GUCP) at selected times and 
locations for previous mission launches.  Initial findings were completed in time to support the 
Space Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) held on January 10, 2002.   
 
Image Screening - The Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) vent arm was seen to contact the south side of 
the support structure at, or near, the saddle plate.  A large-appearing piece of dark-colored debris 
was seen falling almost vertically downward toward the left SRB flame trench as a result of the 
vent arm contact.  The vent arm did not latch-back and the Gaseous Umbilical Carrier Plate 
(GUCP) was seen to rebound beyond the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) a distance equal to 
approximately one half the length of the GUCP (estimated to be a distance of approximately one 
foot).  See Figure 2.1.1.  The left SRB was the closest part of the launch vehicle to the vent arm 
during the rebound; however, the rebound motion did not bring the GH2 vent arm significantly 
close to the launch vehicle.    Using the left SRB for scaling (the SRB diameter equals 12 feet), it 
appeared that the distance between the vent arm at the point of maximum rebound and the left 
SRB was at least thirteen to fifteen feet during liftoff.  Neither the rebounded vent arm / carrier 
plate nor the debris from it’s FSS impact was observed to contact the launch vehicle. The GH2 
vent arm retraction appeared normal on the camera views.  No excessive slack or other unusual 
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conditions were observed in the GH2 vent arm lanyard during retraction.  As typically seen, ice 
from the ET GUCP vent fell during the GH2 vent arm retraction (camera E33).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.1 GH2 Vent Arm at Point of Maximum Rebound                                             
(Camera E60, Time 22:19:31.029 UTC) 
 
 
2.1.2 GH2 Vent Impact Timeline  
 
An event timeline was prepared from the cameras that view the STS-108 GH2 vent line 
retraction.  Table 2.1.2 provides the times as viewed on camera E60 and camera E41.  
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Time (UTC) Event Camera 
22:19:28.002 GH2 vent arm at disconnect E60 
22:19:29.335 GH2 vent arm during retraction at mid drop E60 
22:19:29.666 GH2 vent arm impacts FSS and debris first seen E41 
22:19:29.731 – 
22:19:31.134 
Single piece of dark debris falls toward 
LSRB flame duct and is obscured by SRB 
exhaust plume 
E41 
22:19:29.925 Motion of GH2 vent arm appears to momentarily stop. E60 
22:19:31.029 GH2 vent arm (carrier plate) at point of maximum rebound E41 and 60 
22:19:31.362 
SRB aft skirt level with bottom of GH2 
vent arm support structure (FSS) during 
liftoff 
E60 
22:19:31.657 SRB aft skirt at mid-level of GH2 vent arm support structure (FSS) during liftoff E60 
22:19:31.971 SRB aft skirt level with top of GH2 vent arm support structure (FSS) during liftoff E60 
22:19:59.240 GH2 vent arm after Launch Vehicle clears tower E60 
 
Table 2.1.2 GH2 Vent Line Retraction Timeline 
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2.1.3  Analysis of the STS-108 Anomalous GH2 Vent Arm Release  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.3 (A) View of GUCP (Camera E33) 
 
The Space Shuttle Systems Integration Team requested a comparison of the imagery from 
camera E-33 from STS-108 and selected previous launches.   After a review of which additional 
cameras contained views that might contribute information about the behavior of the vent arm, 
the imagery from camera E33 for STS-108 and selected previous launches was analyzed.   See 
Figure 2.1.3 (A).  Camera E-33 is a 200 frame per second high speed 16mm motion picture 
camera mounted on the FSS.  The camera was positioned about 68 feet from the GUCP, looking 
slightly down and South of East.  The camera had a 100 mm focal length lens and provided an 
excellent view of the GUCP at launch.  During main engine start, the forces from the engines 
force the vehicle stack to sway (the Twang maneuver).  At the level of the GUCP, the stack 
sways about 20 inches to the North and rebounds about 9 inches before the SRB’s (Shuttle 
Rocket Booster) ignite.  At SRB ignition the GH2 vent arm disconnects from the External Tank 
and swings down away from the vehicle (pivoting around a shoulder joint where it attaches to 
the FSS) to its capture position within the FSS while the vehicle accelerates upward.  The entire 
horizontal motion of the GUCP during the Twang is within the field of view of the camera.  
During the disconnect the GUCP first released at the top, pivoted out around its feet which were 
standing on two small shelves projecting from the ET, and then fell vertically once the feet had 
been dragged off their shelves.   Soon after the GUCP disconnects from the ET, it exited the 
bottom of the field of view. 
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The Engineering Photographic Analysis team at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) digitized 
the film from STS-108, and STS-104, -102, -97, -106, -95, -61, -58, -52 and provided the 
digitized movies to IS&AG for concurrent analyses.  This analysis focused on whether there was 
anything anomalous in the vehicle motion parallel to the ET’s Z axis prior to GUCP disconnect 
from the ET.  It was decided that a comparison of the GUCP motion during the time just before 
SSME ignition to liftoff from the various missions would be sufficient to indicate whether the 
STS-108 pre-launch motion was abnormal.  The analysis used a single camera view (E-33) and 
assumed that the camera was aligned with the ET coordinate system such that all motion in the 
horizontal dimension on the camera’s image plane was directly related to motion along the ET’s 
Z axis.  A scale factor was determined that related the measurement of the GUCP motion in the 
image plane to actual motion in inches along the ET Z axis.  All measurements of GUCP 
position from just before SSME startup to liftoff were therefore measured in the image plane (in 
pixels) and then scaled to motion in inches along the ET’s Z axis. 
 
The interval of the movies that was digitized began about 600 frames prior to main engine 
ignition and ended 1600 frames later, after the GUCP was no longer within the field of view.  In 
all movies except from STS-108, -106, and –104, 600 frames showing the initial twang motion 
were excluded.  The portions of the movies that were included were sufficient to show the initial 
vehicle position, the position of maximum twang, and the position of GUCP release.  By 
measuring these positions it would be possible to determine the magnitude of the twang for each 
mission, the magnitude of the rebound prior to GUCP disconnect, and the time interval between 
max twang and GUCP disconnect. 
 
The camera exhibited significant vibration, making it difficult to unambiguously determine the 
frame showing maximum twang and thus directly make the measurements.  A distinctive point 
was selected on the GUCP in the first frame and its position was tracked through all successive 
frames.  The tracking was done automatically by special purpose software using area-based 
correlation.  The result was a trajectory of the point in image coordinates showing the large scale 
motion with a superimposed oscillatory noise signal that varied in magnitude.  A sub-interval of 
the trajectory around maximum twang was selected and a quadratic polynomial was fit to the 
trajectory by least-squares approximation.  The minimum of the quadratic was taken to show the 
frame and coordinate of maximum twang. 
 
The frame of GUCP release was determined by visual inspection.  The position of the GUCP in 
this frame as measured by the tracking software was used in computing the magnitude of the 
rebound.  This method neglects the noise contribution to the apparent position of the GUCP. 
 
A comparison of the maximum twang, rebound, and duration or rebound from all nine missions 
examined found no significant differences between STS-108 and the eight reference missions.  
Minor variations that were deemed to be insignificant were observed.  The three earliest 
missions all showed GUCP release positions closer to the initial position (further South) than all 
of the later missions.  The STS-108 trajectory showed a very small (0.1 inch) excursion to the 
South immediately prior to beginning the Twang.  None of the variations were judged to be large 
enough to have carried the vent arm outside of its design permitted position envelope.  As long 
as the vent arm (and GUCP) remain within their design permitted position volumes at all times 
prior to disconnect, it should not be possible for the vehicle to impart anomalous motion on the 
vent arm.  This statement appears to neglect the possibility of the vehicle to have thrown the vent 
arm by some sudden acceleration while remaining within the excursion limits.  This possibility is 
Summary of Significant Events 
STS-108 JSC Summary Report A11 
excluded by the fact that the STS-108 trajectory does not differ from the reference trajectories at 
any point by enough to indicate that any such mission unique acceleration could have occurred. 
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Figure 2.1.3 (B) STS-108 GUCP Motion 
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Displacement from Rest Position for STS-108 
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Figure 2.1.3 (C) Launch Vehicle Displacement from Rest Position 
 
2.1.4  Analysis of Time between Mach Diamond Formation and Liftoff 
 
Post-SSME start excursions for the ET GUCP derived for STS-108 and several previous 
missions were examined from the launch imagery.  The results indicate STS-108 was within 
flight experience base.  See Table 2.1.4.  Times were derived from films for Mach diamond 
formation to maximum twang and GUCP release for STS-108, STS-104, STS-102, STS-97, 
STS-106, and STS-95.   The data indicated that the STS-108 time was slightly greater than the 
other missions, but did not appear to be out of family.  (The timing was not correlated to engine 
start command, thrust build-up or T-0 command.) 
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Mission 
Average Times between 
Mach Diamond 
formation and PIC Firing 
(seconds) 
Maximum Twang 
along ET Z axis 
(inches) 
Distance in inches 
along ET Z axis 
from Rest to 
Release (inches) 
STS-108 3.202 -20.41 -11.21 
STS-104 3.131 -21.16 -11.87 
STS-102 3.045 -20.12 -11.36 
STS-97 3.079 -20.49 -11.37 
STS-106 3.016 -20.88 -11.17 
STS-95 3.136 -20.38 -11.47 
 
Table 2.1.4 Times between Mach Diamond Formation and Liftoff 
 
 
2.2 KSC, JSC, MSFC Film / Video Analysis Teams Landing + 3 Day Intercenter   
Consolidated Film Review Report 
 
2.2.1 Defect on Drag Chute Canopy 
 
One anomalous event was seen on the STS-108 landing imagery that was elevated to the 
Landing +3 day Intercenter Consolidated Film Review Report. 
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Figure 2.2.1 (A) Defect on Drag Chute Canopy 
 
A defect (hole or tear) was visible on the drag chute canopy during the chute dis-reef until drag 
chute release during the landing roll-out of the Orbiter on KSC Runway 15.  See Figure 2.2.1 
(A).  JSC engineers stated that it appeared that two of the drag chute ribbons had failed.  No 
effect on the dynamics from the hole in the drag chute was seen on the landing imagery.  A 
report of this finding on the drag chute canopy was sent to the Shuttle Program distribution.  The 
anomalous drag chute event was taken to the January 10, 2002 Shuttle Program Control Board 
(PRCB) post-flight review.   
 
A post-landing evaluation of the STS-108 drag chute was conducted at KSC.  Ribbons 34 thru 40 
on gore 31 were found to be broken. The vertical ribbon was also found to be broken. The 
ribbons did not have any indications of friction burning from contact with other nylon elements. 
KSC engineers reported that they suspect that the hole was caused by contact with the cotton line 
ties or the deployment bag flaps. (The deployment bag shows no damage but the bag is made of 
teflon and Kevlar and is tough compared to the canopy ribbons.)  
 
It was also noted during the KSC post-landing evaluation that one of the Kevlar ties that secure 
the pilot parachute deployment bag to the sabot was loose and that one of the deployment bag 
Summary of Significant Events 
STS-108 JSC Summary Report A15 
beckets/loops had been completely torn from the bag (the remaining two beckets had broken 
stitchings).  Table 2.2.1 (A) contains a timeline of the STS-108 landing and drag chute deploy 
events. 
 
Event Description Time (UTC) Camera 
Left main gear door opening 351:17:54:50.140 KTV15L 
Right main gear door opening 351:17:54:50.306 KTV15L 
Right main gear tire touchdown 351:17:55:10.884 EL17 IR 
Left main gear tire touchdown 351:17:55:11.050 EL17 IR 
Drag chute initiation ~351:17:55:16.055 EL17 IR 
Pilot chute bag release ~351:17:55:16.566 EL10 
Pilot chute at full inflation 351:17:55:16.885 KTV33L 
Drag chute bag release 351:17:55:17.386 KTV33L 
Dark object visible on drag chute 351:17:55:17.836 EL10 
Hole first seen on drag chute 351:17:55:18.241 EL10 
Drag chute inflation in reefed 
configuration 351:17:55:18.821 KTV33L 
Black object seen on drag chute 351:17:55:21.391 EL10 
Drag chute inflation in disreefed 
configuration 351:17:55:21.957 KTV33L 
Nose gear tire touchdown 351:17:55:23.926 KTV33L 
Hole visible 351:17:55:26.089 – 351:17:55:32.701 EL2 
Hole visible 351:17:55:37.558 –     351:17:55:43.512 EL2 
Ribbon like material above drag chute 351:17:55:43.761 EL2 
Ribbon like material above drag chute 
lost from view 351:17:55:45.746 EL2 
Two black objects visible on drag chute 351:17:55:47.046 EL15 
Drag chute release 351:17:55:48.317 KTV33L 
Wheel Stop ~351:17:56:16.971 KTV11L 
 
Note:  ~ Denotes that the time shown is approximate. 
 
Table 2.2.1 (A) Timeline of Landing and Drag Chute Deploy Events  
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Figure 2.2.1 (B) STS-108 Drag Chute Deploy Sequence Showing Possible Hole Formation 
(Camera EL10) 
 
On the STS-108 landing imagery, the tip of the drag chute was seen to rebound and contact the 
drag chute during the initial deploy.  See Figure 2.2.1 (B).  The hole in the drag chute was visible 
immediately after the rebound and contact. 
 
At the request of the Space Shuttle Program management, imagery from previous daylight Space 
Shuttle landings were reviewed for indications of the drag chute folding back on itself similar to 
that seen on STS-108. 
 
Table 2.2.1 (B) is a summary of the results from the film screening of fourteen daylight landings 
prior to STS-108 for indications of the drag chute rebounding during deployment.  Table 2.2.1 
(B) contains the times for the drag chute bag release, and the times for the drag chute in the 
reefed configuration for twenty-two previous daylight landings. 
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Mission Runway Rebounding 
or Folding 
Back of 
Drag Chute 
during 
Deploy 
* Pitch 
Angle at 
Deploy 
Time between 
Bag Release 
& Reefed 
Configuration 
(seconds) 
*Winds 
(kts)    
Cross 
(+=L) 
*Winds 
(kts) 
Head 
**Bag 
Height 
(Feet) 
STS-
108 
KSC 15 Rebound 8.97 1.44 1 5.9 23 ± 2 
STS-
105 
KSC 15 Normal 9.23 1.41 6 0 23 ± 2 
STS-
100 
EAFB 
22 
Rebound 10.16 0.93 -5.5 4.3  
STS-98 EAFB 
22 
Slight 
Rebound 
6.37 0.83 1.5 19.9  
STS-92 EAFB 
22 
Normal 8.45 0.7 3.3 8.4  
STS-99 KSC 33 Normal -3.91 2.0 -6.9 1.2  
STS-91 KSC 15 Normal -3.8 2.4 6.6 -2.4 51 ± 4 
STS-90 KSC 33 Rebound 7.1 1.09 3.9 -0.7 33 ± 3 
STS-89 KSC 15 Normal 8.32 1.14 3.8 -3.2 22 ± 2 
STS-87 KSC 33 Rebound 9.36 1.06 0 6 23 ± 2 
STS-86 KSC 15 Normal -3.67 1.97 8.7 2.3  
STS-75 KSC 33 Slight 
Rebound 
6.74 0.86 0.9 13 23 ± 2 
STS-74 KSC 33 Normal 7.19 0.8 -4.5 5.4  
STS-70 KSC 33 Normal 7.18 .07 3.8 -3.2  
STS-71 KSC 15 Normal 8.26 1.09 6.1 -3.5  
 Note:  *Pitch angle and wind data provided by Boeing. 
**Heights are crude approximations of the height of the drag chute bag above the runway. 
 
Table 2.2.1 (B) Previous Mission Film Screening for                                                         
Rebound of the Drag Chute during Deploy 
 
Measurements were made from film of the height of the main chute bag above the runway at bag 
release.  The height of the drag chute bag above the runway for each landing analyzed is also 
provided in Table 2.2.1 (B).  The bag release heights are estimates and do not indicate exact 
heights of the drag chute bag above the runway.  The values approximate the various heights that 
the drag chute may deploy at depending on the variables such as the Orbiter pitch, drag chute 
initiation time and wind velocities.  The bag height data will be used to characterize the behavior 
of the drag chute at these different deploy heights. 
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2.3 Other Launch Observations 
 
2.3.1 Debris from SSME Ignition through Liftoff 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.1 (A) Rectangular-shaped Debris during SSME Ignition (Camera E5) 
 
 
Two unidentified pieces of red-colored debris were seen between SSME #2 / SSME #3 and the 
+Z side of the body flap before falling aft during SSME ignition (22:19:23.898 and 22:19:24.280 
UTC).  These debris pieces appeared rectangular in shape and somewhat stiff, resembling 
possible tags or tile shims.  It is possible that this debris was RCS paper, however, they did not 
appear flexible and did not “float” as RCS paper debris typically does.   These objects were not 
identified from the other camera views.   (Camera E5)  
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Figure 2.3.1 (B) Ice Contacts LH2 Umbilical Well Door Sill (Camera OTV109) 
 
Multiple pieces of ice debris were seen falling from the ET/Orbiter umbilicals and along the –Z 
side of the body flap during SSME ignition through liftoff.  Six pieces of umbilical ice debris 
were seen to contact the LH2 umbilical well door sill during SSME ignition (22:19:23.584, 
22:19:23.750, 22:19:24.151, 22:19:24.818, 22:19:25.185, 22:19:26.120 UTC).  No damage to the 
launch vehicle was detected.  See Figure 2.3.1 (B).  Umbilical ice debris contacting the Orbiter 
surfaces has been seen on previous missions.  (Cameras OTV163, OTV109, E4, E5, E18, E19, 
E20, E34, E36, E52, E63) 
 
A light-colored piece of debris was seen between SSME #2 and SSME #3 near the base heat 
shield falling aft along the + Z side of the body flap during SSME ignition.  This debris appeared 
to be RCS paper (22:19:25.197 UTC).  An unidentified dark-colored piece of debris (possibly a 
paint chip) fell aft along the LO2 TSM  (22:19:25.197 UTC).  (Camera E5) 
 
A single piece of light-colored debris (probably SRB flame duct material) was seen north of the 
MLP during liftoff (22:19:29.10 UTC).  (Cameras KTV4B, KTV7B, KTV21B).  On camera 
E222, several pieces of debris were seen north of the MLP. 
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Figure 2.3.1 (C) Debris Near RSRB Aft Skirt During Liftoff (Camera E1) 
 
Multiple pieces of SRB throat plug and/or SRB flame duct debris were seen near the right and 
left SRBs during liftoff.  On camera E5, a light-colored piece of debris first seen on the east side 
of the RSRB traveled toward the –Z side of the body flap before falling aft.  An unidentified, 
light-colored piece of debris was seen near the RSRB and the ET aft dome falling aft towards the 
–Z side of the Orbiter body flap during liftoff (22:19:28.55 UTC).  (Camera OTV160)  A light-
colored piece of unidentified debris was seen near the RSRB aft stiffener ring moving in a –Y 
direction beneath the ET aft dome during liftoff (22:19:28.749 UTC).  Several pieces of 
unidentified light-colored debris (possibly SRB flame duct material) were seen moving from the 
vicinity of the ET toward the Orbiter near the time of liftoff (22:19:26.386, 22:19:27.788 UTC).  
(Camera OTV109)  An unidentified, dark-colored piece of debris was first seen on the east side 
of the MLP near the RSRB aft skirt and moved in a northwest direction during liftoff 
(22:19:29.324 UTC).  Also, a large, dark-appearing piece of debris was seen near the RSRB aft 
skirt moving in a –Y direction and traveled to the north side of the LSRB aft skirt.  (Camera E1)  
See Figure 2.3.1 (C).  On camera E222, several pieces of probable SRB throat plug or SRB 
flame duct debris were seen near the RSRB aft skirt and moved upwards toward the trailing edge 
of the right wing (22:19:30.061 UTC). (Cameras E2, E222)  None of this debris was seen to 
contact the launch vehicle.   
 
On camera E63, a single piece of debris was seen near the LSRB aft skirt moving in a +Y 
direction and then fell aft of the SSMEs (22:19:30.356 UTC).  (Cameras OTV160, E4, E5, E17, 
E63, E222) 
 
A small, white-colored piece of debris was seen falling from near the ET/Orbiter forward attach 
bipod between the ET and the Orbiter fuselage tiles during liftoff (22:19:30.858 UTC).  This 
debris was probably frost / ice from the forward LO2 feedline bellows.  The debris did not 
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appear to contact the Orbiter tiles.  (Camera OTV161) 
 
A light-colored object that appeared to be flashing as it tumbled was first seen near the MLP and 
appeared to move upward at the same rate as the launch vehicle during liftoff (22:19:29.900 
UTC).  (Camera E34)  
 
2.3.2 Debris During Ascent 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.2 (A) Spray of RCS Paper Debris Seen Aft of Left Wing During Ascent     
(Camera E52) 
 
Multiple pieces of debris, too numerous to count (mostly umbilical ice and RCS paper debris), 
were seen falling aft of the launch vehicle during ascent.   See Table 2.3.2 (A). 
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Event Time Event Description 
22:19:39.213 UTC RCS paper debris seen near the aft end of the 
launch vehicle (Camera ET207, E54) Multiple 
pieces of RCS paper debris were seen forward of 
the vertical stabilizer along the Orbiter fuselage and 
falling aft along the left wing (E54). 
22:19:39.549 and 
22:19:40.344 UTC 
Multiple pieces of RCS paper debris seen near left 
wing (E52) See Figure 2.3.2 (A). 
22:19:43.45 UTC RCS paper debris seen near the aft end of the 
launch vehicle (Camera ET207) 
22:19:48.680 UTC ET / Orbiter umbilical ice fell aft along body flap 
(E224) 
22:19:52.983 UTC Umbilical ice debris fell along body flap (E222) 
22:19:54.553 UTC RCS paper debris seen at base of the SSMEs (207, 
E222) 
22:19:56.509 UTC Multiple pieces of forward RCS paper debris seen 
near the base of the vertical stabilizer (E222) 
22:20:06.309 UTC Forward RCS paper seen falling past vertical 
stabilizer (E220) 
22:20:13.371 UTC Large piece of probable RCS paper seen at base of 
vertical stabilizer (E220) 
 
Table 2.3.2 (A) RCS Paper and Umbilical Ice Debris During Ascent 
 
 
Several pieces of ET / Orbiter umbilical purge barrier material were seen to detach from the ET / 
Orbiter umbilical and fall aft along the body flap during the roll maneuver (22:19:43.416 UTC).  
ET/Orbiter purge material debris during ascent has been seen on previous mission imagery.  
(Cameras E207, E212, E220) 
 
Light-colored debris (possibly instafoam from the RSRB aft skirt) moved inboard toward the 
SSMEs and fell aft into SSME exhaust plume during ascent (22:19:52.853 through 22:19:52.997, 
22:20:00.800 through 22:20:00.886 UTC).  (Cameras E207, E222) 
 
A single piece of debris seen near the LSRB traveled in a +Z direction toward the Orbiter and 
fell aft into the SSME exhaust plume (22:20:00.806 UTC).  This debris was not seen to contact 
the launch vehicle.  (Camera E223) 
 
As on previous missions, debris was seen exiting the SRB exhaust plumes.  The debris exiting 
the SRB exhaust plumes during the majority of ascent was probably instafoam from the aft end 
of the SRB’s.  The more dense appearing debris near the time of tail-off, just prior to SRB 
separation, was probably SRB slag debris.  Examples of this debris can be seen in Table 2.3.2 
(B). 
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Event Time Camera 
22:19:36.672 UTC E52 
22:19:53.900 UTC E54 
22:19:55.735 UTC E54 
22:19:56.800 UTC E54 
22:20:03.441 UTC E222 
22:20:24.734 UTC E223, E224 
22:20:31.336 UTC E220 
22:20:38.16 UTC KTV4B 
22:20:39.00 UTC KTV4B 
22:20:40.03 UTC KTV4B 
22:20:44.55 UTC ET212 
22:20:45.10 UTC KTV4B 
22:20:46.44 UTC KTV4B 
22:20:48.01 UTC KTV4B 
22:21:27.556 UTC KTV4B, KTV13, ET207, ET208, E207 
22:21:28.65 UTC KTV4B 
22:21:29.57 UTC KTV13 
22:21:31.94 UTC ET208 
 
Table 2.3.2 (B) Debris Seen Exiting the SRB Exhaust Plume 
 
2.3.3 Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) Events 
 
The SSME ignition appeared normal.  During SSME start-up, the SSME Mach diamonds formed 
in the expected sequence (3, 2, 1). (Cameras E19, E20, E76)  The times for the Mach diamond 
formation given in Table 2.2.3 are from film E19: 
 
SSME TIME (UTC) 
SSME #3 22:19:24.701 
SSME #2 22:19:24.758 
SSME #1 22:19:24.923 
 
Table 2.3.3 SSME Mach Diamond Formation Times 
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Figure 2.3.3 (A) Orange Vapor Seen Above SSME Rims Prior to Liftoff                       
(Camera OTV170) 
 
Orange vapor (possibly free burning hydrogen) was seen forward of the base of the vertical 
stabilizer, near the base heat shield, forward of the trailing edge of the OMS pods, and on the –Z 
side of the body flap during SSME ignition.  Orange vapor forward of the aft end of the Orbiter 
during SSME ignition has been seen on previous mission films and videos.  (Cameras OTV170, 
E1, E2, E4, E17, E19, E20, E36, E52, E63, E76) 
 
A slight flexing of the base heat shield between the SSME cluster was seen during SSME 
ignition (22:19:24.360 UTC).  Flexing of the base heat shield, although not common, has been 
seen on previous mission films.  (Camera E76) 
 
Flickering of the LH2 TSM T-0 barrier material was seen during SSME ignition.  This event has 
been seen on previous mission imagery.  (Camera OTV170) 
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Frost was seen on the –Y ET nose cone vent louver during liftoff.  Frost on the ET vent louvers 
has been seen on previous mission imagery.  (Camera OTV061) 
 
Light-orange-colored streaks were seen in the SSME exhaust plumes, possibly debris induced, 
after SSME ignition and prior to liftoff at the times shown below (Cameras E1, E2, E18, E19): 
 
SSME #1 - 22:19:26.672, 22:19:27.194, 22:19:30.048, 22:19:30.086 UTC 
SSME #2 - 22:19:26.762 UTC 
SSME #3 - 22:19:25.616, 22:19:26.190, 22:19:27.993 UTC 
 
Streaks in the SSME exhaust plume prior to liftoff have been seen on previous mission films. 
 
Typical of previous missions, small areas of tile surface coating material erosion were seen on 
the tip of the right RCS stinger, on the base of the left RCS stinger near the L1U RCS 
(22:19:23.3 UTC), on the base heat shield outboard of SSME #2 (22:19:23.323 UTC), and near 
the base of the right OMS nozzle during SSME ignition (22:19:24.5 UTC).  (Cameras E17, E18, 
E19, E20)   
 
No significant movement of the OMS pod tiles during SSME ignition was detected on the STS-
108 camera films.  (Cameras E17, E18) 
 
A small piece of LO2 TSM T-0 umbilical ice contacted the +Y side of SSME #3 just above the 
rim (22:19:27.585 UTC).  Also, a small piece of LH2 TSM T-0 umbilical ice contacted the -Y 
side of SSME #2 just above the rim (22:19:25.303 UTC).   No damage to the SSME surfaces 
was noted.  (Cameras E17, E18) 
 
Both of the TSM doors appeared to rebound slightly before closing during liftoff.  Slight 
rebounds of the TSM doors have been seen on previous mission films.  (Cameras E19, E20, E76) 
 
SRB ignition was at 22:19:27.996 UTC based on the observation of the PIC firing at LSRB 
holddown post M-8.   (Camera E14)  
 
A small, dark-colored piece of debris was seen exiting the Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU) exhaust 
port near LSRB holddown post M-6 and fell into the SRB flame duct during liftoff 
(22:19:28.621 UTC). (Camera E13) 
 
The left and right SRB GN2 purge lines appeared wrapped, upright, and intact until they were 
obscured by exhaust plumes at 22:19:30.076 UTC (right purge line) and 22:19:27.702 UTC (left 
purge line). (Cameras E8, E13) 
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2.3.4 Ascent Events 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3.4 Flare Seen in SSME Exhaust Plume (Camera E222) 
 
Multiple light-orange-colored flares (possibly debris induced) were noted in the SSME exhaust 
plume during ascent on the long range tracking camera films.  Often on previous mission 
imagery, debris has been seen contacting the SSME exhaust plume resulting in visible flares.  
Usually this debris was RCS paper.  (On STS-26 and STS-101, debris that resulted in very large 
orange-colored flares was determined to have been tile material.)  Examples of flares seen on 
STS-108 can be seen in Table 2.3.4:   
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Time Event Camera 
22:19:36.011 UTC Flare seen in SSME exhaust plume E52 
22:19:38.508 UTC Flare seen in SSME exhaust plume E52 
22:19:41.988 UTC White-colored flash in SSME exhaust 
plume 
KTV41B 
22:19:46.843 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E222 
22:19:48.676 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E207, E222 
22:19:52.940 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E207 
22:19:53.200 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume ET207 
22:19:54.666 UTC RCS paper induced flare in SSME #1 
exhaust plume 
E222, E223 
22:19:55.086 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E207 
22:19:55.530 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume ET207 
22:19:55.608 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E222, E223 
22:19:57.170 UTC Flare in SSME #3 exhaust plume ET207 
22:19:59.721 UTC Flare in SSME exhaust plume E207 
22:20:00.840 UTC Debris first seen near aft end of LSRB 
induced flare in SSME exhaust plume 
ET207 
22:20:01.137 UTC Flare in SSME #2/3 exhaust plume E222 
22:20:02.151 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume   E223 
22:20:02.700 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E222, E223 
22:20:02.770 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E222 
22:20:13.000 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E207 
22:20:13.344 UTC Flare KTV4 
22:20:13.447 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume E222 
22:20:13.480 UTC Flare in SSME #1 exhaust plume ET207 
 
Table 2.3.4 Flares Seen in SSME Exhaust Plumes During Ascent  
 
 
A white-colored streak was seen near the base of the vertical stabilizer (possibly RCS paper 
debris) during ascent (22:20:06.237 UTC).  (KTV4B) 
 
Bright spots (or flickering) were seen on the +Z side of the left RCS stinger which was probably 
a piece of partially detached RCS paper during ascent (22:19:43.683 UTC).  (Partially detached 
RCS paper on the left RCS stinger was seen at lift off on the camera E20 view.)  The RCS paper 
was seen to detach from the left RCS stinger during ascent at 22:20:03.725 UTC. (Camera E220) 
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Body flap motion typical of that seen on previous missions was seen during ascent (22:19:52 
through 22:20:18.4 UTC).  (Camera ET207, E207, E212, E223) 
 
An orange-colored flash from the early OMS-2 assist burn was seen approximately ten seconds 
after SRB separation (22:21:42.321 UTC).  (Cameras KTV13, ET208, E212) 
 
2.4 Onboard Photography of the External Tank (ET-111) 
 
2.4.1 16mm Umbilical Well Camera Films 
 
The LSRB separation appeared normal on the two 16mm umbilical well camera films.  Similar 
to previous missions, numerous light-colored pieces of debris (insulation) and dark debris 
(charred insulation) were seen throughout the SRB separation film sequence.  Typical ablation 
and charring of the ET/Orbiter LH2 umbilical electric cable tray and the aft surface of the -Y 
upper strut fairing were seen prior to SRB separation.  Numerous irregularly shaped pieces of 
debris (charred insulation) were noted near the base of the LSRB electric cable tray prior to SRB 
separation.  Pieces of TPS were seen detaching from the aft surface of the horizontal section of 
the -Y ET vertical strut.  The amount of ablation of the TPS on the aft dome was typical of 
previous flights.  The left SRB nose cap was visible during SRB separation. 
 
The ET separation from the Orbiter was too dark for analysis on the 16 mm umbilical well 
camera films due to the nighttime conditions.  However, for short periods, portions of the aft end 
of the ET could be seen from the light coming from the RCS thruster firings.  No anomalous 
conditions were noted.   
 
The film quality of both of the 16 mm umbilical well camera films was good during the SRB 
separation sequence.  Timing data was present on the 16mm umbilical well camera films.     
 
2.4.2 35mm Umbilical Well Camera Film (Roll 384) 
 
The ET separation from the Orbiter was not imaged on the 35 mm umbilical well camera films 
due to darkness.  
 
2.4.3 ET Handheld Imagery 
      
2.5 Landing Events Timing 
 
The time codes from videos were used to identify specific events during the screening process.  
The STS-108 landing event times are provided in Table 2.2.1 (A). 
 
2.6 Landing Sink Rate Analysis 
 
Image data from the SLF North centerline video camera at the approach end of runway 15 was 
used to determine the landing sink rate of the main gear. In the analysis, data from approximately 
The 35mm handheld film and the Camcorder video of the ET were not acquired on STS-108 
because of darkness.  
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one second of imagery immediately prior to touch down for each of the landing gear was 
considered. Data points defining the main gear struts were collected on every frame (30 frames 
of data during the last second prior to touch down with respect to each landing gear). An 
assumption was made that the line of sight of the camera was perpendicular to the Orbiter's y-
axis. The distance between the main gear struts (272 inches) was used as a scaling factor. The 
main gear midpoint height above the runway was calculated by the change in vertical difference 
between the main gear struts and the reference point on the runway.  A trendline for the midpoint 
between the main gear was determined considering the height of the Orbiter above ground with 
respect to time. Sink rate equals the slope of each regression line. 
 
The main gear sink rate for the STS-108 landing at one second, at half a second, and at a one 
quarter of a second are provided in Table 2.6 (A). 
 
 
Time Prior to Touchdown Main Gear Midpoint Sink 
Rate 
Estimated Error (1σ) 
1.00 Sec. 1.6 ft/sec ± 0.2 ft/sec 
0.50 Sec. 2.3 ft/sec ± 0.3 ft/sec 
0.25 Sec. 2.8 ft/sec ± 0.8 ft/sec 
 
Table 2.6 (A) Main Gear Midpoint Landing Sink Rate  
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Figure 2.6 (B) Main Gear Midpoint Landing Sink Rate 
 
The maximum allowable main gear sink rate values are 9.6 feet / second for a 212,000 lb. 
vehicle and 6.0 feet/second for a 240,000 lb. vehicle.  The landing weight of the STS-108 vehicle 
was reported to be 226,442 lbs.   
 
2.7 Other 
 
2.7.1 Normal Events 
 
Normal events observed included: 
 
• elevon motion prior to liftoff 
• ice / frost on SSME purge drain-line vents 
• birds near the launch vehicle during liftoff 
• RCS paper debris from SSME ignition through liftoff 
• ET twang 
• ice and vapor from the LO2 and LH2 TSM T-0 umbilicals prior to and / after disconnect 
• multiple pieces of ET/Orbiter umbilical ice debris falling along the body flap during liftoff 
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• vapor off the SRB stiffener rings 
• acoustic waves in the exhaust cloud during liftoff 
•          debris in the exhaust cloud (including water baffle material) after liftoff 
• ET aft dome outgassing and charring of the ET aft dome during ascent 
• roll maneuver  
• expansion waves  
• linear optical effects  
• recirculation  
• SRB plume brightening 
• SRB slag debris before, during, and after SRB separation 
    
2.7.2 Normal Pad Events  
 
Normal pad events observed included: 
 
•   hydrogen burn igniter operation 
•   FSS and MLP deluge water activation 
•   sound suppression system water operation 
•   TSM T-0 umbilicals disconnect and retraction 
•   LH2 and LOS2 TSM door closure 
 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B. MSFC PHOTOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
 
 
 
The MSFC Report can be accessed on their Engineering Photographic Analysis website at 
https://photo4.msfc.nasa.gov/. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Space Shuttle Mission STS-108 
 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Summary Report 
Marshall Space Flight Center 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T. J. Rieckhoff (NASA/MSFC) 
M. Covan (USA) 
J.M. O’Farrell (USA) 
D.H. Osborne (ERC) 
 
 
February 22, 2002 
Marshall Space Flight Center, 
Huntsville, AL 35812 
Contents 
 
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-108 ................................................... 1 
STS-108 Photographic Analysis Summary:........................................................................ 1 
Photographic Analysis Website: ......................................................................................... 1 
Photographic Coverage: ...................................................................................................... 1 
T-Zero Timing:.................................................................................................................... 2 
SRB Separation Timing: ..................................................................................................... 2 
Anomalous Events: ............................................................................................................. 3 
Film Camera E36: GH2 Vent Arm Retraction ................................................................ 3 
Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound................................................................... 4 
Film Camera E42: Debris from GH2 Vent Arm Impact.................................................. 5 
Film Camera E42: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound................................................................... 6 
Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Drop Sequence Comparison .................................... 7 
Film Camera E33: GH2 Vent Arm Separation Sequence Comparison ........................... 7 
Observations:....................................................................................................................... 8 
Film Camera E52: Free Burning Hydrogen..................................................................... 8 
Video Camera OTV170: Free Burning Hydrogen........................................................... 9 
Video Camera TV4B: Free Burning Hydrogen ............................................................. 10 
Video Camera OTV109: Frost/Ice near Umbilical Well Doorsill ................................. 11 
Film Camera E2: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume...................................................... 12 
Film Camera E33: Frost/Ice from GUCP ...................................................................... 13 
Film Camera E9: Debris near Holddown Post M1 ........................................................ 14 
Film Camera E2: Engine Streaks in SSME#1 Plume .................................................... 15 
Film Camera E3: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume...................................................... 16 
Film Camera E207: Debris Falling Aft.......................................................................... 17 
Film Camera E207: Umbilical Well Purge Barrier Debris............................................ 18 
Film Camera E220: Debris Falling Aft.......................................................................... 19 
Video Camera TV4B: RCS Butcher Paper Debris ........................................................ 20 
Film Camera E222: RCS Butcher Paper Debris ............................................................ 21 
Film Camera E223: Debris Induced Streak ................................................................... 22 
Video Camera ET213: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plume.................................... 23 
Video Camera ET212: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plumes .................................. 24 
Video Camera TV4B: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes ............................................. 25 
Film Camera E224: Debris Ejected From SRB Plumes ................................................ 26 
Film Camera E205: Flow Recirculation ........................................................................ 27 
Film Camera E207: Debris at SRB Separation.............................................................. 28 
Film Camera E205: Slag Debris .................................................................................... 29 
Film Camera FL101: ET/SRB Separation ..................................................................... 30 
Video Camera TV13: OMS Motor Burn after SRB Separation .................................... 31 
Special Investigations:....................................................................................................... 32 
GH2 Vent Arm Retraction Investigation: Film Digitization ......................................... 32 
GH2 Vent Arm Retraction Investigation: Analysis of Film Camera E33 Imagery....... 33 
Data:...................................................................................................................................................... 33 
GUCP Deflection in the X- and Z-Directions:...................................................................................... 36 
GUCP Separation Angle and Release at Pivot Point: ........................................................................... 47 
Individual Camera Assessments: ...................................................................................... 50 
 ii
Video Camera Assessments........................................................................................... 50 
Film Camera Assessments ............................................................................................. 50 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Film Camera E36: GH2 Vent Arm Retraction ................................................... 3 
Figure 2. Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound....................................................... 4 
Figure 3. Film Camera E42: Debris from GH2 Vent Arm Impact ..................................... 5 
Figure 4. Film Camera E42: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound....................................................... 6 
Figure 5. Film Camera E60: Vent Arm Drop Comparison Movie...................................... 7 
Figure 6. Film Camera E33: Vent Arm Drop Separation Comparison Movie ................... 7 
Figure 7.  Film Camera E52: Free Burning Hydrogen........................................................ 8 
Figure 8.  Video Camera OTV170: Free Burning Hydrogen.............................................. 9 
Figure 9.  Video Camera TV4B: Free Burning Hydrogen................................................ 10 
Figure 10.  Video Camera OTV109: Frost/Ice near Umbilical Well Door Sill ................ 11 
Figure 11.  Film Camera E2: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume....................................... 12 
Figure 12.  Film Camera E33: Frost/Ice from GUCP ....................................................... 13 
Figure 13.  Film Camera E9: Debris near Holddown Post M1......................................... 14 
Figure 14.  Film Camera E2: Engine Streaks in SSME#1 Plume ..................................... 15 
Figure 15.  Film Camera E3: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume....................................... 16 
Figure 16.  Film Camera E207: Debris Falling Aft........................................................... 17 
Figure 17.  Film Camera E207: Umbilical Well Purge Barrier Debris............................. 18 
Figure 18.  Film Camera E220: Debris Falling Aft........................................................... 19 
Figure 19.  Video Camera TV4B: RCS Butcher Paper Debris ......................................... 20 
Figure 20.  Film Camera E222: RCS Butcher Paper Debris............................................. 21 
Figure 21.  Film Camera E223: Debris Induced Streak .................................................... 22 
Figure 22.  Video Camera ET213: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plume..................... 23 
Figure 23.  Video Camera ET212: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plumes ................... 24 
Figure 24.  Video Camera TV4B: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes .............................. 25 
Figure 25.  Film Camera 224: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes..................................... 26 
Figure 26.  Film Camera E205: Flow Recirculation ......................................................... 27 
Figure 27.  Film Camera E207: Debris at SRB Separation............................................... 28 
Figure 28.  Film Camera E205: Slag debris at SRB Separation ....................................... 29 
Figure 29.  Film Camera FL101: ET/SRB Separation ...................................................... 30 
Figure 30.  Video Camera TV13: OMS Motor Burn after SRB Separation ..................... 31 
Figure 31. Drawing of Tracked Points .............................................................................. 33 
Figure 32. Image of Tracked Points .................................................................................. 33 
Figure 33. Z-Component Determination of Projection into Image Plane ......................... 34 
Figure 34. Calculation of Estimated Deviation to Actual Travel Distance....................... 35 
Figure 35. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-108 ..................................................... 37 
Figure 36. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-106 ..................................................... 37 
Figure 37. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-104 ..................................................... 38 
Figure 38. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-102 ..................................................... 38 
Figure 39. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-97 ....................................................... 39 
Figure 40. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-95 ....................................................... 39 
 iii
Figure 41. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-61 ....................................................... 40 
Figure 42. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-58 ....................................................... 40 
Figure 43. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-52 ....................................................... 41 
Figure 44. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-62 ....................................................... 41 
Figure 45. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-63 ....................................................... 42 
Figure 46. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-64 ....................................................... 42 
Figure 47. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-78 ....................................................... 43 
Figure 48. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-81 ....................................................... 43 
Figure 49. Z-Excursion for All Missions .......................................................................... 44 
Figure 50. X-Excursion for All Missions.......................................................................... 44 
Figure 51. Three Sigma Bounds for Z-Excursion Data .................................................... 45 
Figure 52. Three Sigma Bounds and Z-Excursion Data at Maximum Deflection............ 45 
Figure 53. Three Sigma Bounds and Z-Excursion Data at T-0......................................... 46 
Figure 53. Three Sigma Bounds and X-Excursion Data at T-0 ........................................ 46 
Figure 54. Separation Angle in Image Plane..................................................................... 47 
Figure 55. GUCP Separation Drawing.............................................................................. 48 
Figure 56. GUCP/ET Separation Angle in Image Plane................................................... 49 
Figure 57. GUCP/ET Separation Angle............................................................................ 49 
 
 
 
Tables 
 
Table 1. STS-108 Camera Coverage................................................................................... 2 
Table 2. STS-108 T-0 Timing ............................................................................................. 2 
Table 3.  Film Digitization List......................................................................................... 32 
Table 4. Scale Factors ....................................................................................................... 36 
Table 5. Z-Excursion Results ............................................................................................ 36 
Table 6. GUCP Release Timing........................................................................................ 47 
 
 
 
 
 
 iv
Engineering Photographic Analysis Report for STS-108 
 
Launch of the one-hundred-seventh Space Shuttle mission, STS-108, seventeenth 
flight of the Orbiter Endeavour (OV-105), occurred December 5, 2001at 4:19 PM 
CST from launch complex 39-B, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. Launch time 
is reported as 01:339:22:19:27.987 Universal Coordinated Time (UTC) by the MSFC 
Flight Evaluation Team. 
 
STS-108 Photographic Analysis Summary: 
One anomalous event was observed on launch film cameras E33, E34, E36, E41, E42, E52, and E60 
covering Space Shuttle mission, STS-108. This item was included in the Launch+4 Day 
“CONSOLIDATED FILM REVIEW REPORT”, 12 December 2001- CFVR-108-01, as noted below.  
 
At GMT 22:19:28.002 the Gaseous Hydrogen (GH2) vent arm contacted the side of the support structure 
at, or near, the saddle plate. A large-appearing piece of dark-colored debris was seen falling almost 
vertically downward toward the left SRB flame trench as a result of the vent arm contact. The vent arm did 
not latch-back and the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) was seen to rebound beyond the Fixed 
Service Structure (FSS) a distance equal to approximately one half the length of the GUCP (estimated to be 
a distance of approximately one foot). The left SRB was the closest part of the launch vehicle to the vent 
arm during the rebound; however, the rebound motion did not bring the GH2 vent arm significantly close to 
the launch vehicle. Using the left SRB for scaling (the SRB diameter equals 12 feet), it appeared that the 
distance between the vent arm at the point of maximum rebound and the left SRB was at least thirteen to 
fifteen feet during liftoff. Neither the rebounded vent arm/carrier plate nor the debris from the FSS impact 
was observed to contact the launch vehicle.  The GUCP/ET separation appeared normal on the camera 
views. No excessive slack or other unusual conditions were observed during the GH2 vent arm lanyard 
retraction. 
 
 
Photographic Analysis Website: 
Further information concerning photographic analysis of this and previous space shuttle missions is 
available on the MSFC Engineering Photographic Analysis website at URL: 
 
http://photo4.msfc.nasa.gov/STS/sts108/sts108.html 
 
 
Information available on the MSFC Engineering Photographic Analysis website includes: 
 Photographic Acquisition Disposition Document (PADD), 
 Individual camera status and assessments, 
 Annotated images of notable observations, 
 Movies of select events, and 
 Photographic Analysis Mission Summary Report ( PDF format). 
 
Photographic Coverage: 
Photographic and video coverage has been evaluated to determine proper operation of the flight hardware. 
Video and high-speed film cameras providing this coverage are located on the fixed service structure 
(FSS), mobile launch platform (MLP), perimeter sites, Eastern Test Range tracking sites and onboard the 
vehicle.  
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Sixty-three engineering photographic products consisting of launch video, ground-based engineering films 
and onboard film were received and reviewed at MSFC. Camera coverage received at MSFC for STS-108 
is illustrated in the following table.   
 
 
 16mm 35mm Video 
MLP 19 0 3 
FSS 5 0 3 
Perimeter 0 7 4 
Tracking 0 9 11 
Onboard 2 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 
Totals 24 16 21 
Table 1. STS-108 Camera Coverage 
 
No video was received from video cameras OTV154 and OTV171. Camera OTV109 loses focus as the 
vehicle lifts off. Cameras OTV141 and OTV160 were overexposed at or after liftoff. Camera OTV148 
loses track of the vehicle at liftoff.  
 
Film cameras E57 and E59 lost track of the vehicle after liftoff.  Film from camera E31 was of little 
engineering value due to poor focus. 
 
T-Zero Timing: 
T-Zero times are regularly determined from MLP cameras that view the SRB Holddown posts, without 
doghouse covers, M-1, M-2, M-5, and M-6. These cameras, listed below with their corresponding 
Holddown Post, record the explosive bolt combustion products.  
 
 
Holddown Post Camera  Time (UTC) 
M-1 E9 339:22:19:27.996 
M-2 E8 339:22:19:27.996 
M-5 E12 339:22:19:27.995 
M-6 E13 339:22:19:27.994 
Table 2. STS-108 T-0 Timing 
 
SRB Separation Timing: 
SRB separation time, as recorded by observations of the BSM combustion products from long-range film 
camera E207, occurred at 339:22:21:31.921 UTC.  
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Anomalous Events: 
 
One anomalous event was noted during the screening of the STS-108 launch films. The Gaseous Hydrogen 
(GH2) vent arm contacted the south side of the support structure at, or near, the saddle plate. The left SRB 
was the closest part of the launch vehicle to the vent arm during the rebound; however, the rebound motion 
did not bring the GH2 vent arm significantly close to the launch vehicle.  The GH2 vent arm retraction 
appeared normal on the camera views.  No excessive slack or other unusual conditions were observed in 
the GH2 vent arm lanyard during retraction. 
 
A more thorough investigation of this incident was initiated. MSFC was asked to digitize film from camera 
E33 from several missions (STS-108, STS-104, STS-106, STS102, STS-97, STS-95, STS-61, STS-58, and 
STS-52) for the teams to analyze and also perform an independent investigation of the digitized films. 
Analysis of the film included an analysis of the motion of the GUCP during ET tip deflection and GH2 
Vent Arm retraction. The analyses are included in the Special Investigations section of this report. 
 
Movies of the digitized film from Camera E33 and results of the analyses are available on the website.  
 
 
Film Camera E36: GH2 Vent Arm Retraction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Film Camera E36: GH2 Vent Arm Retraction 
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Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound 
 
The GH2 Vent Arm did not latch-back and the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate (GUCP) was seen to 
rebound beyond the Fixed Service Structure (FSS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound 
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Film Camera E42: Debris from GH2 Vent Arm Impact 
 
A large piece of light-colored debris (falling almost vertically downward toward the left SRB flame trench) 
resulting from the GH2 Vent Arm impact with the Fixed Service Structure (FSS) was observed. The debris 
did not impact the vehicle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Film Camera E42: Debris from GH2 Vent Arm Impact 
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Film Camera E42: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound 
 
The extent of the GH2 Vent Arm rebound is noted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Film Camera E42: GH2 Vent Arm Rebound 
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Film Camera E60: GH2 Vent Arm Drop Sequence Comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Film Camera E60: Vent Arm Drop Comparison Movie 
 
A movie of the vent arm drop sequence from missions STS-108, STS-85, STS-27, STS-28R, and STS-30 
was made. Comparison of the vent arm drop sequences detected little variation between missions. The 
movie may be observed on the engineering photographic analysis website. 
 
 
 
Film Camera E33: GH2 Vent Arm Separation Sequence Comparison  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Film Camera E33: Vent Arm Drop Separation Comparison Movie 
 
A movie of the vent arm separation sequence from missions STS-108, STS-104, STS-102, STS-97, STS-
106, STS-95, STS-61, STS-58, STS-52, STS-62, STS-63, STS-64, STS-78, and STS-81 was made. 
Comparison of the vent arm separation sequences detected little variation between missions. The movie 
may be observed on the engineering photographic analysis website. 
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 Observations: 
 
Film Camera E52: Free Burning Hydrogen 
 
Free burning Hydrogen was observed at SSME ignition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Film Camera E52: Free Burning Hydrogen 
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Video Camera OTV170: Free Burning Hydrogen 
 
Free burning Hydrogen was observed at SSME ignition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Video Camera OTV170: Free Burning Hydrogen 
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Video Camera TV4B: Free Burning Hydrogen 
 
Free burning Hydrogen was observed at SSME ignition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.  Video Camera TV4B: Free Burning Hydrogen 
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Video Camera OTV109: Frost/Ice near Umbilical Well Doorsill 
 
Ice/frost impacted the umbilical well doorsill. No damage was observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Video Camera OTV109: Frost/Ice near Umbilical Well Door Sill 
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Film Camera E2: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume 
 
An engine streak was noted in SSME #1 plume. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11.  Film Camera E2: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume 
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Film Camera E33: Frost/Ice from GUCP 
 
Frost was noted around the periphery of the GUCA after GH2 Vent arm retraction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Film Camera E33: Frost/Ice from GUCP 
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Film Camera E9: Debris near Holddown Post M1 
 
Debris was observed emanating from Debris Containment System of HDP M1 just after PIC firing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Film Camera E9: Debris near Holddown Post M1 
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Film Camera E2: Engine Streaks in SSME#1 Plume 
 
Other engine streaks noted in SSME #1 plumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Film Camera E2: Engine Streaks in SSME#1 Plume 
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Film Camera E3: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume 
 
An engine streak was noted in SSME #1 plume after vehicle lift-off. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  Film Camera E3: Engine Streak in SSME#1 Plume 
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Film Camera E207: Debris Falling Aft 
 
Debris was noted falling aft of the vehicle. This debris is thought to be butcher paper from the forward RCS 
motors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Film Camera E207: Debris Falling Aft 
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Film Camera E207: Umbilical Well Purge Barrier Debris  
 
Debris was observed falling aft of the vehicle. This debris is thought to be umbilical well purge barrier 
material. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Film Camera E207: Umbilical Well Purge Barrier Debris 
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Film Camera E220: Debris Falling Aft 
 
Debris was noted falling aft of the vehicle on the –Z side of the External Tank. The debris appeared to 
emanate from forward of the SRB-ET aft attach point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Film Camera E220: Debris Falling Aft 
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Video Camera TV4B: RCS Butcher Paper Debris 
 
Debris flows aft of the vehicle. The debris is thought to be butcher paper from the forward RCS motors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Video Camera TV4B: RCS Butcher Paper Debris 
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Film Camera E222: RCS Butcher Paper Debris 
 
Debris was observed falling aft of the vehicle. This debris appears to be butcher paper from forward RCS 
motors. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Film Camera E222: RCS Butcher Paper Debris 
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Film Camera E223: Debris Induced Streak 
 
Typical debris induced streaks were noted in the SSME plumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21.  Film Camera E223: Debris Induced Streak 
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Video Camera ET213: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plume 
 
Debris induced streaks were noted in SSME plumes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22.  Video Camera ET213: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plume 
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Video Camera ET212: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plumes 
 
Debris induced streaks were observed in the SSME #1 plume. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23.  Video Camera ET212: Debris Induced Streak in SSME Plumes 
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Video Camera TV4B: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes 
 
Debris was observed emanating from the SRB plumes prior to SRB separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Video Camera TV4B: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes 
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Film Camera E224: Debris Ejected From SRB Plumes 
 
Slag ejected from the SRB plumes was observed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Film Camera 224: Debris Ejected from SRB Plumes 
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Film Camera E205: Flow Recirculation 
 
Flow recirculation was noted at the aft of the external tank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Film Camera E205: Flow Recirculation 
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Film Camera E207: Debris at SRB Separation 
 
Slag debris was observed emanating from the SRB plumes at SRB separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27.  Film Camera E207: Debris at SRB Separation 
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Film Camera E205: Slag Debris 
 
Slag debris from SRB plumes was observed at SRB separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Film Camera E205: Slag debris at SRB Separation 
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Film Camera FL101: ET/SRB Separation 
 
A slight twang at the EB-9 electrical connector interface of the ET/SRB upper attach was observed at 
ET/SRB separation. This motion has been observed on previous missions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29.  Film Camera FL101: ET/SRB Separation 
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Video Camera TV13: OMS Motor Burn after SRB Separation 
 
The scheduled OMS motor burn was observed after SRB separation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  Video Camera TV13: OMS Motor Burn after SRB Separation 
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Special Investigations: 
 
GH2 Vent Arm Retraction Investigation: Film Digitization 
 
Since high-resolution digital images were necessary for the required GUCP motion accuracy, MSFC was 
initially tasked to digitize film from camera E-33 for missions STS-108, STS-104, STS-106, STS102, STS-
97, STS-95, STS-61, STS-58, and STS-52 on our Oxberry Film-to-Digital Image Transfer equipment and 
provide those digitized images to JSC Image Science and Analysis Group. Digitization of camera E33 
images from other missions was later requested as well as images from other cameras. Mission and camera 
information for the digitized films are provided in Table 3. 
 
Each mission film was digitized into a sequence of 700 frames. The frame rate for film camera E-33 is 200 
frames/second (fps). One second of film, 200 frames, was digitized from a period before SSME ignition 
and 2.50 seconds of film, 500 frames, beginning at approximately 0.5 seconds before T-0. 
 
 
 
 Mission PAD T-0 (GMT) E33 E39 E60 E42
STS-108 B 339:22:19:27.987 D,M,A D,M D,M
STS-104 B 193:09:03:58.991 D,M,A
STS-102 B 067:11:42:09.004 D,M,A
STS-097 B 336:03:06:00.986 D,M,A
STS-106 B 252:12:45:47.008 D,M,A
STS-95 B 302:19:19:33.984 D,M,A
STS-61 B 336:09:26:59.983 D,M,A
STS-58 B 291:14:53:10.009 D,M,A
STS-52 B 296:17:09:39.007 D,M,A
STS-62 B 063:13:53:00.009 D,M,A
STS-63 B 034:05:22:03.994 D,M,A
STS-64 B 252:22:22:54.982 D,M,A
STS-78 B 172:14:49:00.019 D,M,A
STS-81 B 012:09:27:22.984 D,M,A
STS-85 A 219:14:41:00.013 D,M
STS-27 B 337:14:30:33.987 D,M
STS-28R B 220:12:37:00.012 D,M D,M
STS-30 B 124:18:46:59.011 D,M
D: Digitization    M: Movie    A: Analysis
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Film Digitization List 
 
A movie was created for each mission and a movie comparing all missions and frame synchronized to T-0 
are available for viewing on the website. Also, selected frames of the event are available. Additionally, 
movies of camera views from Camera E60, E42, and E33 for this STS-108 anomalous event are available 
on the website. 
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GH2 Vent Arm Retraction Investigation: Analysis of Film Camera E33 Imagery 
 
MSFC was tasked to also perform an independent investigation of the digitized films. Analysis of the film 
included an analysis of the motion of the GUCP during ET tip deflection and GH2 Vent Arm retraction.  
Specifically, results from the analysis included: the time and maximum deflection of the GUCP in the Z-
direction, the time and rebound distance of the GUCP, the time of GUCP release, and the angle between the 
GUCP and ET surface as the GUCP pivots away from the ET. 
 
 
Data: 
Values for locations are in External Tank (XT) coordinates (x,y,z). Two points on the GUCP were tracked 
frame-to-frame in each set of digitized images to estimate the motion of the GUCP in the XZ-plane during 
ET tip deflection. These points were the exposed top of bolts (UNJF-3B) (as depicted in IRN No. TC-1603 
pg. 136) located on the forward right and left sides of the GUCP. The distance between these two points 
was reported as 16.375 inches. 
 
GUCP separation point  (1012.918, -143.327, 317.250) 
Camera E33 location  (745.000,   -911.000, 262.000) 
 
 
16.375 
B A
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Drawing of Tracked Points 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Image of Tracked Points 
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The principal camera axis did not appear to coincide with the separation point on the GUCP and a small 
correction where the principal camera axis intersects the plane of the GUCP was made.  
 
GUCP/Principal camera axis intersection point        (1019.518, -140.124, 311.702) 
 
An additional point was tracked in each set of images to estimate the angle of separation between the 
GUCP and ET surface as the GUCP pivots away from the ET. This point was a located near the GUCP 
pivot point. These locations were estimated from drawings. 
 
GUCP pivot point     (Point C)        (1045.380, -150.093, 312.432) 
GUCP top “right” point     (Point B)        (1003.170, -144.626, 316.500) 
 
 
The digitized sequences were comprised of two segments. The first segment included two hundred frames 
with approximately one hundred of those frames before SSME ignition and the second segment was 
composed of approximately five hundred frames beginning just before maximum ET tip deflection until 
just after the vehicle leaves the pad. 
 
The initial two hundred frames from each sequence were used to obtain a reference position and a scaling 
factor relating distance in the image to distance in pixels in the image plane. The projection of the vector 
from Point A to Point B, LG , into a plane parallel to the film plane results in a vector, LGF , which scales 
the actual distance of 16.375 inches between the Points A and B into the distance as seen in a plane parallel 
to the film plane. Since we need the motion in the z-direction, we project the vector, LGF , into the xz-plane 
to obtain the vector, LGFZ . An overall scale factor for motion in the z direction was determined separately 
for each mission by dividing the magnitude of the LGFZ vector by the average pixel distance between the 
Points A and Points B over the first two hundred frames.  
 
 LG
LGF
LGFZNormal to
Film Plane 
β
 φ
Z axis
= 65.31 degrees φ
β = 86.52 degrees
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33. Z-Component Determination of Projection into Image Plane  
 
 
 
The above scaled orthographic projection method introduces a small error in calculation of travel distance. 
The error was estimated to be about 0.01 -0.03 inches and was neglected since that amount of deviation 
was not significant compared to the deviation in travel distance due to measurement error. This deviation 
was calculated by determining the angle λ, Figure 34 , the angle of the line of sight vector with the focal 
plane, the angle ε (90-β from the projection method diagram), and using the estimated lengths calculated by 
the projection method. 
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Figure 34. Calculation of Estimated Deviation to Actual Travel Distance 
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GUCP Deflection in the X- and Z-Directions: 
 
Point A,  Figure 32, was selected as a reference for the rest position for the GUCP.  The distance, measured 
in pixels, from the rest position to the location of the tracked Point A , multiplied by the scale factor, (select 
scale factors illustrated in Table 4 ), yields the approximation to the distance, in inches, traveled from the 
rest position.  
 
 
 STS-108 0.04930
STS-104 0.04900
STS-102 0.05088
STS-106 0.04932
STS-52 0.05047
STS-97 0.04956
STS-95 0.04937
STS-61 0.04988
STS-58 0.05042
Mean XZ-Plane Scale Factor = 0.04980
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Scale Factors 
 
Separate X and Z deflection charts are shown in Figure 35 through Figure 43.   Also contained in these 
charts is the smoothed curve for the Z excursion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Z-Excursion Results 
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Figure 35. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-108 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-106 
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Figure 37. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-102 
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Figure 39. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 40. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-95 
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Figure 41. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-61 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-58 
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Figure 43. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-62 
 
 
 41
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-63 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-64 
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Figure 47. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48. X- and Z-Excursion of GUCP on STS-81 
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Figure 49. Z-Excursion for All Missions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 50. X-Excursion for All Missions 
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Figure 51. Three Sigma Bounds for Z-Excursion Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 52. Three Sigma Bounds and Z-Excursion Data at Maximum Deflection 
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Figure 53. Three Sigma Bounds and Z-Excursion Data at T-0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 54. Three Sigma Bounds and X-Excursion Data at T-0 
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GUCP Separation Angle and Release at Pivot Point: 
 
By visual inspection of the film, the time of GUCP release at the pivot point was determined, Table 6. A 
separate calculation was made for the angle at the GUCP release from the ET.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. GUCP Release Timing 
 
 
To illustrate the generally consistent GUCP motion as it pivots away from the ET, a graph illustrating the 
separation angle observed in the image was created including all missions. The cosine of the angle was 
calculated using the dot product method for vectors illustrated in Figure 55. Results are shown in Figure 57.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. Separation Angle in Image Plane
 47
 To calculate the actual angle of separation between the GUCP and the ET surface, a point near the pivot 
axis, Point C in Figure 32, was tracked. The vector, from point C to the previously tracked point B, initially 
lies almost entirely in the x-direction of the plane of the GUCP and its motion follows the pivoting GUCP 
plane. This vector’s motion may also be characterized analytically by equations rotating the vector about 
the pivot axis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 56. GUCP Separation Drawing 
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The motion of the GUCP as it pivots through an angle θ may be characterized by multiplying a vector 
representing a line through points B and C,                                      ,  by a rotation matrix. 


= UyUU zxU
ˆˆˆ
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )θ
θ
θ
θ
/23θcos0.5θsin0.5
0.5-θcos/23θsin/23
0.0θsin-θcos
U
zU
yU
xU
zU
yU
xU
==
⋅⋅
⋅⋅
























ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
 
 
 
 
 
If  n is the unit normal vector to the image plane, then  V = U(θ) - <n,U(θ)>n  is the projection of U(θ) into 
the image plane. The magnitude of V may be equated to the magnitude of the observed magnitude of U(θ). 
This generates a trigonometric equation that may be solved for the separation angle θ. 
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Figure 57. GUCP/ET Separation Angle in Image Plane 
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Figure 58. GUCP/ET Separation Angle 
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 Individual Camera Assessments: 
 
Assessments for individual cameras are listed below. The assessments for all individual cameras 
including camera characteristics as noted in the Photographic Acquisition Disposition Document (PADD) 
for flight STS-108 may also be found on the website. 
 
Video Camera Assessments 
 
TV4B Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle.  Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB 
plume prior to, during and after separation. Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME plume.  
Free burning Hydrogen noted near the vertical stabilizer.  Pad debris noted north of MLP at 
liftoff.  Forward RCS paper noted falling past orbiter wing.   
TV7B Pad debris noted rising and falling. 
TV13 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume prior to, during and after separation. SRB 
separation time recorded as: 339:22:21:31.9 UTC. OMS burn noted after SRB separation, 
339:22:21:42.2 UTC. 
TV21B Free burning Hydrogen observed near orbiter base heat shield at SSME startup. 
OTV109 Ice/frost strikes umbilical well doorsill. No damage noted.  Camera loses focus as orbiter 
begins to lift off. 
OTV141 Free burning Hydrogen observed at SSME startup.  Camera overexposed at liftoff.   
OTV148 Camera loses track of vehicle at liftoff. 
OTV151 Little detail visible due to overexposure of SSME plumes. 
OTV154 Video was not available. 
OTV160 Video overexposed after liftoff. 
OTV161 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle.  Small white colored object noted aft of the 
bipod between the ET and orbiter. This object appears to travel upward out of field of view.  
A second small white colored object was noted forward of the aft attach points between the 
ET and orbiter. 
OTV163 Ice/frost from 17 inch disconnects impacts the umbilical well door sill. No damage to vehicle 
noted.  Typical pad debris.   
OTV170 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle.  Free burning Hydrogen noted near base heat 
shield. 
OTV171 Video was not available. 
ET207 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle.  Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB 
plume prior to, during and after separation. Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME plume.  
Linear optical distortions noted.  Flow recirculation noted.  Typical body flap motion 
observed. 
ET208 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume prior to, during and after separation. SRB 
separation: 339:22:21:31.91 UTC.  OMS burn noted approximately 10 seconds after SRB 
separation. 
ET212 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume after separation.  Debris-induced streaks 
observed in SSME plume.  Linear optical distortions noted. 
ET213 Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME plume.  Debris ejected from SRB plumes during 
ascent. 
 
 
Film Camera Assessments  
 
E1 Typical ice/frost from 17-inch disconnects. Debris from SRB exhaust hole observed moving 
away from vehicle. 
E2 Free Hydrogen burning noted. Three engine streaks were noted in the SSME#1 plume, all 
emanating from approximately the 1 o'clock position. These streaks occurred at 
339:22:19:28.979, 339:22:19:30.047, and 339:22:19:30.085 UTC.  
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E3 Several engine streaks noted in SSME#1 plume at 339:22:19:27.204, 339:22:19:27.250, 
339:22:19:28.000, 339:22:19:28.707, and 339:22:19:30.088 UTC.  
E4 Pad debris noted rising and falling. 
E6 Typical ice/frost from 17-inch disconnects. Tape-like debris material falling out of field of 
view observed. 
E7 Pad debris noted rising and falling. SRB Aft Skirt Foam observed emanating from SRB 
Exhaust Hole. 
E8 SRB Holddown Post M2 PIC Firing time at 339:22:19:27.996 UTC. SRB Aft Skirt foam 
debris observed emanating from SRB Exhaust Hole. 
E9 SRB Holddown Post M1 PIC firing time noted at 339:22:19:27.996 UTC. Debris observed 
emanating from Debris Containment System of HDP M1 just after PIC firing. 
E10 Pad debris noted rising and falling. 
E11 Dark colored debris noted falling through field of view.  Typical SRB exhaust hole debris.   
E12 SRB Holddown Post M5 PIC firing time at 339:22:19:27.995 UTC. Typical SRB exhaust 
hole debris.  Loose string between SRB thermal curtains was noted.  
E13 SRB Holddown Post M6 PIC firing time at 339:22:19:27.994 UTC. 
E14 Typical pad debris observed. 
E15 Pad debris noted rising and falling. Typical ice/frost from 17-inch disconnects. 
E16 Pad debris noted rising and falling. 
E17 Typical ice/frost from LO2 disconnect. Engine streak noted in SSME#3 plume. 
E18 Typical ice/frost from 17-inch disconnects. 
E19 Free burning Hydrogen noted. Mach diamond formation in 3-2-1 order. 
E20 Free burning Hydrogen noted. 
E31 Film was of little engineering value due to poor focus. 
E33 Frost noted falling from GUCP during ET tip deflection. 
E34 GH2 Vent Line retraction appears normal. GH2 Vent Line rebound unable to be observed.   
E36 GH2 Vent Line retraction observed. Although the GH2 Vent Line was mostly obscured by 
vapors/mist, possible rebound from FSS was observed. No contact with vehicle was observed.   
E40 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. 
E52 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Typical ice/frost from 17-inch disconnects. Free 
Burning Hydrogen observed at SSME ignition. GH2 Vent Line rebound observed. No contact 
with vehicle noted. 
E54 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. 
E57 Camera loses track of vehicle after liftoff. 
E59 Camera loses track of vehicle after liftoff. 
E60 GH2 Vent Line rebound observed. 
E62 Pad debris noted rising and falling. Free burning Hydrogen noted. 
E63 Pad debris noted rising and falling. 
E204 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume prior to, during and after separation.  
Linear optical distortions noted. OMS motor burn after SRB separation noted. 
E205 Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB plume prior to, during and after separation.  
Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME plume. Flow recirculation noted. SRB separation: 
339:22:21:39.919 UTC. Forward RCS motor firing observed during SRB separation. 
E207 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME 
plume. Linear optical distortions noted. Flow recirculation noted. SRB separation: 
339:22:21:31.921 UTC.  Forward RCS motors noted firing during SRB separation. Purge 
barrier material noted falling from orbiter at 339:22:19:43.142 UTC. Bright ring inside 
SSME#3 nozzle noted during ascent. 
E212 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB 
plume prior to, during and after separation. Linear optical distortions noted. Vehicle partially 
obscured by clouds. Forward RCS motors firing noted during SRB separation. OMS       
motor burn noted after SRB separation. 
E213 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Glowing debris particles ejected from SRB 
plume prior to separation. Fluctuating bright area on Left OMS POD observed, probably 
flapping butcher paper. 
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E220 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Purge barrier debris material noted at 
339:22:19:55.337 UTC.  Bright spots noted near Left OMS Pod nozzle. Debris observed on -
Z side of ET emanating from forward of the SRB/ET aft attach point. 
E222 Pad debris noted rising and falling.  Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle.  Debris 
ejected from SRB plumes during ascent. 
E223 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Debris-induced streaks observed in SSME 
plume.  Linear optical distortions noted.  SRB separation: 339:22:21:31.923 UTC. 
E224 Typical debris observed falling aft of vehicle. Debris ejected from SRB plumes at 
339:22:20:24.749 UTC. 
FL101 Slight twang noted at separation on Left ET/SRB at Upper Aft Attach EB-9. ET/Orbiter 
separation occurred in darkness. Typical ablative debris observed. 
FL102 Limited visibility of ET/Orbiter due to darkness. Slight twang noted at ET/SRB separation at 
Aft Upper Attach EB-9. Typical debris observed. 
 
For further information concerning this report contact Tom Rieckhoff/TD53 at 256-544-7677 or Michael 
O’Farrell at 256-544-2620. 
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